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The recent indictment of the American law school as a reproducer
of illegitimate hierarchy leaves one wondering whether nothing remains
sacred.' Virtually no aspect of the law school has escaped attack. Its
atmosphere has been decried as impersonal and anti-intellectual; 2 its
professors derided for mystifying and cruelly subjugating their students;
3
and its curriculum criticized as morally bankrupt and politically tilted.
4
All these effects coalesce, it is said (with the self-righteousness of one
who has resisted evil forces to which mere mortals fall prey), to breed
cronies for the corporate law firm.
5
Whether one is an attacker, a defender, or an innocent bystander in
the legal-education battle, one can scarcely help but notice that the stu-
dent-run law review has escaped the fray virtually unscathed. 6 The clem-
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1. See, e.g., Feinman, The Failure of Legal Education and the Promise of Critical Legal
Studies, 6 CARDOZO L. REv. 739 (1985) [hereinafter Feinman, Failure]; Feldman & Feinman,
Legal Education: Its Cause and Cure (Book Review), 82 MICH. L. REV. 914 (1984) [hereinaf-
ter Feldman & Feinman, Cause and Cure] (reviewing R. STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL
EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 1850s TO THE 1980s (1983)); Foster, The "Cooling Out"
of Law Students: Facilitating Market Cooptation of Future Lawyers, in GOVERNING THROUGH
COURTS 177 (1981); Halpern, On the Politics and Pathology of Legal Education, 32 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 383, 383 (1982); Kennedy, Legal Education as Training for Hierarchy, in THE POLITICS
OF LAW 40 (D. Kairys ed. 1982) [hereinafter Kennedy, Hierarchy].
2. See infra notes 47-57 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 13-21 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 59-65 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 66-73 and accompanying text.
6. Legal writing and scholarship have been critiqued extensively, see infra notes 136-139
and accompanying text, infra note 180, and law professors have been increasingly vocal in
bemoaning the power that student-run law reviews wield over them, see infra notes 35-41 and
accompanying text. The law review as an institution, however, has only recently been spot-
lighted. See Boyle, Dumping: (Colon) on Law Reviews, CLS, May 1987, at 17; Student-Edited
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ency is remarkable. The law review undoubtedly has the potential to be
a serious force against law school alienation, a worthwhile intellectual
and creative experience, and a formidable political actor. Unfortunately,
this cadre of overachievers grossly underachieves-no, retrogrades-in
each respect.
As to the sense of alienation and self-doubt that law school foments,
the law review, far from counterpoising them, enhances both. It repre-
sents a blatantly artificial credential that nonmembers manage to inter-
nalize. It generates even more artificial intra- and inter-school
hierarchies that members internalize. So, if indeed alienation and illegiti-
mate hierarchy plague the law school, one of their prime progenitors
must be the student-run law review.
In addition, the law review's academic and creative value is over-
stated. Many students leave law review with little more to show for their
two-year membership than bluebook proficiency. To the extent that the
law school curriculum is intellectually or creatively destitute, the law re-
view experience is at least as deficient in those categories.
As to political action, the law review-in propagation of the myth
that refusal to take a stand constitutes political neutrality-perpetuates
the status quo by standing for (or against) nothing. For better or for
worse, no other law school institution has a cozier symbiosis with the
corporate law firm.
"What is wrong with law reviews?," queries James Boyle. "RESET
What isn't wrong with law reviews?"' 7 Yet no one-neither member nor
nonmember-has denounced it as a sham. Except possibly for an in-
crease in membership8 and proliferation, 9 the law review has remained
intact and unchanged for a century.' 0 And it is remarkably similar from
Law Reviews, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 1, 1-23 (1986) (article by Roger Cramton and commentary
by Paul Carrington, John Kester, John Henry Schlegel, and Elyce Zenoff).
7. Boyle, supra note 6, at 17. Professor Boyle continues: "On what ground (aesthetic,
literary, scholarly, intellectual, political, egalitarian), by what criteria (originality, readability,
incisiveness) are they not a dismal failure? Where else is the time of so many skilled, intelligent
and potentially creative people expended to produce so little useful effect?" Id.
8. See Cramton, "The Most Remarkable Institution " The American Law Review, 36 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 1, 6 n.24 (1986) [hereinafter Cramton, American Law Review] (staffs have
doubled between late 1950s and early 1980s); Zenoff, I Have Seen the Enemy and They Are Us,
36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 21, 21 n.1 (1986).
9. There are over 250 law reviews affiliated with law schools, and most of them are
student-run. Cramton, American Law Review, supra note 8, at 2. They publish an estimated
150,000 to 160,000 pages per year. Id.; Fidler, Law Review Operations and Management, 33 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 48, 48 (1983).
10. See Schlegel, An Endangered Species 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 18, 19 n.3 (1986) (reiterat-
ing Dean Hutchins's observation in 1920s that law review's product has changed little in last
50 years). On the law review's history and origins, see generally Cramton, American Law
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concerns are worthy of consideration in assessing the law review's insti-
tutional role.
I. A Preliminary Defense of Law Reviews
The law review, in theory, has much to offer. First, it could coun-
terpoise what to some might otherwise be a thoroughly alienating law
school experience. Second, its creative and intellectual focus could
sharpen the student's lawyering skills, encourage the student to develop
novel solutions to legal and social problems, and expose the student to
new ideas. Finally, the law review's dealienating potential, and its crea-
tive and intellectual focus could coalesce to offer its members a unique
invitation to social action.
A. Combatting Law School Alienation
The law school has been criticized, somewhat justifiedly, for its sys-
tematic alienation of students. To the extent that those criticisms are
justified, the law review could do much to counteract that alienation.
(1) Sources of Alienation in the Law School
The most vicious denouncers of law school alienation spare no one.
Professors, administration, the system, and students share the blame. An
outsider reading the harshest accounts would picture law school as a hos-
tile society dominated by sadistic and insecure professors, ruled by an
aloof administration, and overrun by thugs ready to slit each others'
throats for survival or sheer pleasure."
The worst-case scenario, as depicted by the harshest critics, looks
something like this: Law professors-every one them a Kingsfield
12
clone-are determined to subjugate their quaking disciples. "Fear, in-
timidation, and psychological manipulation of a law student's sense of
self" are customary. 13 The professor's determination to deploy such psy-
chological weapons might spring from an insecure need to pick on an
easy target. 14 Or perhaps it stems from a benign, if misguided, objective
to build character in students, preparing them for the harsh lawyer-eat-
11. For vivid fictional accounts of the law school experience written by two former law
students, see J. JAY, THE PAPER CHASE (1971) and S. TUROW, ONE L (1977).
12. See J. JAY, supra note 11.
13. Halpern, supra note 1, at 388.
14. See Davis, The Courtroom Mystique and Legal Education, 23 ARIz. L. REV. 661, 685
(1981) (law professors are tempted "to choose as a target the neophyte rather than the exper-
ienced opponent, to assert competence in the classroom") (footnote omitted).
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one law school to the next. If the law review has failed, a great number
of people have kept it secret.
This Article examines the law review's record and, at the risk of
being forever excommunicated from law review's empire, divulges its two
deep, dark secrets. It begins with a discussion of the law review's theo-
retical potential-as a dealienating force in the law school environment,
nurturer of creativity and intellect, and political actor. The remainder of
the Article identifies the respects in which the law review fails to fulfill
that potential and suggests explanations for that failure. Section II dis-
cusses the expectations that law review members have upon joining its
ranks and concludes that diminished expectations could diminish the
value of the experience.
Then come the two deep, dark secrets. The first secret is that the
law review credential is false. Section III examines the law review selec-
tion processes, including grades, writing competitions, and the submis-
sion of publishable notes, and concludes that they do not select for the
skills most relevant to the editing of a law review. Section IV develops
and divulges the second deep, dark secret: The experience is illusory. It
then offers some speculations as to why the members remain on law re-
view without divulging either secret.
Section V discusses the self-doubt that plagues law review members
because of law review hierarchies. Specifically, within a particular law
review class, an unspoken hierarchy can emerge based upon the differing
processes by which students are selected, and between law reviews there
exist inter- and intra-school hierarchies. Finally, section VI examines the
law review's role as a political actor. First, it concludes that the law
review has only limited autonomy over its own operations, and is un-
likely to be a force in law school politics. Moreover, a false sense of
neutrality prevents the law review from acting affirmatively as a political
force. In the end, the law review serves as little more than a breeding
ground for the corporate law firm.
I emphasize at the outset that I do not accept wholeheartedly the
critical indictments of the law school mentioned above and discussed
throughout. Yet those indictments provide a useful point of departure.
They illustrate-if sometimes to the point of caricature-some legitimate
concerns worth considering in evaluating the law school as an institution.
Because the law review shares many of the features of law school, those
Review, supra note 8, at 1, 2-5; Swygert & Bruce, The Historical Origins, Founding, and Early
Development of Student-Edited Law Reviews, 36 HASTINGS L.J. 739 (1985).
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lawyer world.15 Whatever their motivation, professors go out of their
way to humiliate their students publicly, in a bizarre ritual of "pseudo-
participation." 16 Instead of rebelling, however, the student internalizes
the abuse. Self-doubt sets in: "I deserve to take this shit. I am wrong
and stupid. There is no reason why I should be treated by this great man
with even the most minimal human respect." 17
Professors in this worst-case scenario also mystify the simplest of
concepts.18 The mystification may be an unintended byproduct of a vi-
sionary learning theory: the student will never truly understand the law
unless he discovers it for himself. Perhaps the mystification grows out of
the professor's instinctual self-preservation: if the law is made too palat-
able, the professor will exhaust her knowledge and lose her job. Perhaps
it is simply that professors are too engrossed in their own scholarship 19
or preoccupied with their own prestige2 ° to worry much about the qual-
ity of their teaching.2' Whatever the reason for the mystification, it con-
fuses and frustrates the student.
The law professors only compound the alienation caused by what
some consider to be an inherently oppressive system. That system, it is
15. See id. at 683 (courtroom mystique that underlies law teaching is "paradoxical" be-
cause it is "hailed by the lawyer who, relatively speaking, is least likely to assess it-the law
teacher") (footnote omitted); Kennedy, How the Law School Fails: A Polemic, 1 YALE REV.
L. & Soc. ACTION 71, 81-83 (1970) [hereinafter Kennedy, Polemic] ("a faculty member should
think twice before arguing that the particular emotional atmosphere which dominates the
classroom is ... in some sense essential to the production of successful graduates").
16. Kennedy, Hierarchy, supra note 1, at 42.
17. Kennedy, Polemic, supra note 15, at 76 (emphasis in original).
18. See Kennedy, Hierarchy, supra note 1, at 45-47 (describing elements of legal educa-
tion and three-part mystification of law). Entering students often "believ[e] that law has an
objective content, available to lawyers through their privileged access to certain secret books
and mysterious processes." Feinman & Feldman, Pedagogy and Politics, 73 GEo. L.J. 875, 877
(1985) [hereinafter Feinman & Feldman, Pedagogy]. The criticism is that law professors do
little to disabuse them of, and in fact reinforce, that notion. But see Deutsch, The Teaching of
Corporate Law: A Socratic Investigation of Law and Bureaucracy, 97 YALE L.J. 96 (1987)
(defending Socratic method against challenges of critical legal scholars).
19. See Hacker, The Shame of Professional Schools, 32 J. LEGAL EDUC. 278, 278-79
(1982) (law faculty cares more about their personal pursuits than about student needs). But cf
Cramton, Demystifying Legal Scholarship, 75 GEO. L.J. 1, 10 (1986) [hereinafter Cramton,
Demystifying ("In the American law school, unlike most of the graduate departments of the
university, teaching has been given a more rightful status.").
20. Cramton, Demystifying, supra note 19, at 13-14 (law faculty's pursuit of prestige is
antithetical to student's learning); Feinman, Failure, supra note 1, at 747 ("From the law
faculty's perspective, personal and professional prestige are, for the most part, unrelated to the
performance of graduates.").
21. See Feldman & Feinman, Cause and Cure, supra note I, at 929-30 ("In the traditional
law school vision, the focus is on teaching, not learning." (footnote omitted)); Feinman &
Feldman, Pedagogy, supra note 18, at 875 ("Most legal educators are anti-intellectual about
the area of their primary professional concern: the content and method of legal education.").
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said, instills in law students a feeling of utter lack of autonomy. First,
the curriculum, particularly in the first year, is prescribed and therefore
beyond the law student's control. 22 Second, "[p]hysical and psychologi-
cal exhaustion are . . . programmed into the first year."' 23 The work,
often too excessive to complete, generates a feeling of incompetence and
leaves time for little else but law school.
Third, because all first-year law students instinctually appreciate the
profound importance of their first-year grades to future success, they are
so obsessed with grades that the goal of learning becomes almost inciden-
tal. To make matters worse, most realize that there is nothing they can
do to guarantee their success. More accurately, they never know until it
is too late whether they are doing the right thing. They face the ultimate
test-the law school exam-without so much as a trial run.24 Once
again, they cannot help but doubt their own capabilities.
Finally, they are spit out of the first year with nothing to show for a
year's work but some seemingly arbitrary number stamped on a tran-
script and the class rank it represents. 25 With the ranking, then, comes
"the implicit corollary that place is individually earned, and therefore
deserved,"' 26 and students internalize the ranking as a reflection of their
own self worth.2
7
The one entity of the institution that is best positioned to eliminate
these systemic flaws is the administration. In this bleak portrait of the
law school, however, the administration subtly does more to reinforce
the law student's sense of isolation and helplessness than to alleviate it.
22. In the upper levels, the curriculum seems more flexible, but certain courses are re-
quired and the bulk come with an administration imprimatur of such indispensability that few
law students would dare to forego them. In all fairness, the administration is not entirely to
blame for propagating the rumors that certain courses that cumulatively comprise the corpo-
rate law track are indispensable. The administration, however, by its decision not to dispel
those rumors, passively confirms them.
23. Halpern, supra note 1, at 388.
24. See Feinman & Feldman, Pedagogy, supra note 18, at 881, 910-12 (discussing limited
value of traditional law exam, especially because of lack of other feedback, and proposing
alternative); Motley, A Foolish Consistency: The Law School Exam, 10 NOVA L.J. 723 (1986)
(critiquing traditional law exam as evaluative tool or learning experience and proposing
alternative).
25. See Feinman & Feldman, Pedagogy, supra note 18, at 881, 918-24 (noting law profes-
sors' and students' perception of grades as arbitrary and proposing alternative theory and sys-
tem of grading); Kennedy, Hierarchy, supra note 1, at 50 (students perceived "grades as almost
totally arbitrary-unrelated to how much you worked, how much you liked the subject, how
much you thought you understood going into the exam, and what you thought of the class and
the teacher").
26. Kennedy, Hierarchy, supra note 1, at 51.
27. Cramton, The Current State of the Law Curriculum, 32 J. LEGAL EDuc. 321, 329
(1982); see infra notes 101-06 and accompanying text (discussing legitimacy of grades).
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The administration is depicted as aloof and insensitive to student needs.
There is no student-administration dialogue in the law school. Any com-
munication is vectorial, from administration to student body. Even that
communication is trite. The average student's most extended exposure
to the administration is a brief orientation speech. Perhaps during that
speech, the dean gives a word of advice or a note of encouragement. Per-
haps he even makes a preemptive attempt to dismantle barriers by invit-
ing students to voice concerns. But no one remembers what the
administration says in its orientation speech; because everyone is too anx-
ious to pay much attention. When, if ever, the invitation is repeated it is
often perceived as insincere. Too little, too late.
The critic's picture is not yet complete, for the largest component of
the law school-the student body-has not been described. The critical
description of that component is no more flattering. Relations among
the students are strained at best, outright savage at worst. There is, to be
sure, a certain sense of what might be inaptly labelled "comradery."
Most of it is a mephitic comradery of necessity that is overshadowed by
competition.28 Cooperation, competition, and distrust are inseparable in
the law school world. "Very few people can combine rivalry for grades,
good summer jobs, clerkships, with helping another member of the study
group so effectively that he might actually pose a danger."129 Even if they
could, the solace of comradery evaporates the first time the student is
ridiculed by the professor. Amidst howls of laughter, 30 the law student is
shocked into the rude realization that it is not "us against them," but
"me against the world."
That world, according to the harshest critics, is one in which each
law student must defeat his classmates, as each is being defeated by the
faculty, the administration, and the system. As a result of the combined
forces of professorial abuse and mystification, systemic oppression, and
administrative apathy, the student becomes "fearful, passive, intellectu-
ally uninteresting, and uncreative. '31 Quite predictably, they contend,
the student internalizes, without question, the system of values, attitudes,
and morality that legitimates that world.
32
28. See Motley, supra note 24, at 740-41 (externalities that foster competition stifle capac-
ity to develop meaningful relationships).
29. D. KENNEDY, LEGAL EDUCATION AND THE REPRODUCTION OF HIERARCHY: A
POLEMIC AGAINST THE SYSTEM 65 0983) [hereinafter LEGAL EDUCATION].
30. See Kennedy, Polemic, supra note 15, at 75 ("First year students when acting as a
group in class are as cruel if not crueler than the teachers. They howl with glee when one of
their number is dismembered." (footnote omitted)).
31. Halpern, supra note 1, at 388.
32. "The student is stripped naked, so to speak, so that he may be remade a lawyer. The
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To be sure, some of the criticism is unfair and grossly exaggerated.
It is equally certain, however, that there is at least a kernel of truth to
each of the charges.33 It in no way impugns the character or sensitivity
of the faculty and administration to concede that there are times when
their members are too removed from the pressures of the law school or
too engrossed in the intricacies of the law to appreciate the true extent of
student anxiety. It is hardly revolutionary to suggest that the system-
whether for legitimate reasons or not-does not provide the consistent
and immediate feedback that students fresh out of college have grown to
expect. And it is beyond debate that the dynamic among law students is
marked by a keen sense of competition that necessarily taints whatever
sense of comradery might arise.
My purpose here is not to take a position on the accuracy of the
worst-case scenario. I leave that judgment to the reader. For now, it is
sufficient to observe that there are some alienating pressures that could
readily be diminished.
(2) Dealienation Through Law Review
Perhaps the law review's most important power lies in its potential
to diminish the degree of student alienation in the law school. That
dealienating potential has both "negative" and "affirmative" compo-
nents. The law review could in some respects negate or diminish the
power of the faculty and administration vis-d-vis students, thereby dimin-
ishing their capacity to alienate students. On the other hand, the law
review might also affirmatively foster relationships that promote a sense
of belonging and comradery.
34
The following discussion of the law review's dealienating capacity,
and particularly the discussion of negative-dealienation through law re-
view, is admittedly simplistic in several respects. Like the worst-case sce-
nario, it treats the relationships between faculty or administration and
underlying dynamic . . . parallels a highly structured, controlling, emotionally intense initia-
tory rite used by the church or the military in the indoctrination of their neophytes." Id. at
389.
33. The most recent statistical study of the effects of law school verifies that it enhances
psychological distress among students. See Benjamin, Kaszniak, Sales & Shanfield, The Role
of Legal Education in Producing Psychological Distress Among Law Students and Lawyers,
1986 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 225, 246. The list of symptoms reads like the table of contents to
a psychology text: "obsessive-compulsive behavior, interpersonal sensitivity, depression, anxi-
ety, hostility, phobic anxiety, paranoid ideation, and psychoticism (social alienation and isola-
tion)." Id.
34. The two overlap. Anything that decreases the power of an aggressor is itself likely to
promote a sense of belonging and autonomy, and the formation of strong bonds with others
who feel oppressed by common aggressors could itself undermine that threatening power.
[Vol. 39
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students as oppressive, and their respective interests as diametrically op-
posed. For example, I use the term "oppressive powers" as a convenient
shorthand for the alienating aspects of the administration-student and
faculty-student relationships. Because of its simplification and distortion
of the relationship, the discussion that follows also ignores the fact that
the law review's development and deployment of any of the powers sug-
gested is likely to trigger an endless and unpredictable chain of reaction
and counter-reaction.
As I noted in the discussion of the worst-case scenario, the distor-
tion is not intended to suggest that these relationships are entirely or
even largely oppressive. In fact, the relationships are extremely complex
and the interests of faculty, administration, and students are undoubtedly
more convergent than conflicting. Nor is my purpose to foment revolu-
tion, much less to map out a battle plan. I intend only to illustrate some
of the options by which law reviews might readily dealienate the law
school environment. The extent to which one might advocate adoption
of any of the options will turn on the extent to which one accepts the
worst-case depiction of law school alienation.
a. Negative Dealienation
Insofar as any sense of alienation among students is attributable to a
sense of helplessness and lack of control over the oppressive powers, any
perceived weakening of those powers will necessarily dealienate. Such
negative dealienation can be achieved through at least two mechanisms.
One mechanism, "withdrawal," is to cordon off a refuge within which
the threatening power's influence is diminished. A second mechanism,
"confrontation," is to develop an opposing power that provides leverage
against the oppressive power.
The law review is a natural spearhead for either mechanism of nega-
tive dealienation. It is a refuge-one of the few realms over which
neither administration nor faculty exerts direct control. The most impor-
tant implication of withdrawal is the sense of institutional autonomy it
fosters. At least in theory, all the decisions are the students' to make.
There are no express agendas dictated from above and no direct restric-
tions on form or substance. The administration might strongly recom-
mend an article or a topic, but presumably it could never force the law
review to accept either. The faculty might criticize the law review's
product, but its criticism could never carry with it the humiliation or the
personal affront of public, classroom ridicule.
A less powerful implication of the law review's capacity to withdraw
lies in its sanctuarial qualities. The law review is a physically and emo-
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tionally sheltered environment in which participation is real and volun-
tary, a stark contrast to the quasi-participation of the law school
classroom. The physical insulation also provides an outlet for harmless
aggression against the oppressive powers by permitting ridicule to run in
the other direction. The law review office is one of the few sites within
the law school's boundaries in which it is safe for students to satirize and
even slander professors and administrators. To be sure, their public is a
limited one. Nevertheless, there is a certain (if superficial) solace in con-
fiding to a fellow student that the professor who chided them to express
their thoughts precisely could not write a thought to save his life.
Partially because of the law review's insulation from the direct influ-
ence of the law school's oppressive powers and partially by historical
accident, the law review also has potentially powerful confrontational
weapons against those powers. It is the only law school institution that
actually inverts the usual hierarchy rather than merely withdrawing from
it.
As against the faculty, the law review has the power to judge.
3 5 Stu-
dent judging of professional writing, often the key to faculty tenure, can
have serious practical consequences. In no other academic field do stu-
dents have such control over who publishes and who perishes. "[T]he
normal hierarchy is upset for a day and students lord it over teachers.
' 36
And the teachers do not like it a bit.37 They complain, somewhat justi-
fiedly, that a law student is simply not competent to evaluate legal schol-
arship.38 The real complaint, however, has more to do with power than
35. Course evaluations, in which students are given an opportunity to critique the profes-
sor's effectiveness, organization, selection of materials, availability to students, and general
worth as a human being, could be another example. But there are serious doubts as to whether
all professors take the process seriously, and certainly not all students do.
36. Boyle, supra note 6, at 17.
37. See Cramton, American Law Review, supra note 8, at 7-10 (student-edited law reviews
should be abandoned in favor of greater faculty involvement); Mewett, Reviewing the Law
Reviews, 8 J. LEGAL EDUC. 188, 190 (1955) ("[tihe student has no place on a law review at
all"); Murray, Publish and Perish-By Suffocation, 27 J. LEGAL EDUC. 566 (1975); Rothstein
& Rothstein, Law Reviews Suffer from Lack of Peer Review, Legal Times, Jan. 6, 1986, at 10,
col. 1; Faculty Ponders Alternative Journal, HARV. L. REC., Feb. 10, 1984, at 6; Harvard's
Faculty Stirs a Tempest with Plans for New Law Journal, Wall St. J., May 28, 1986, at 37, col.
4. But see Kester, Faculty Participation in the Student-Edited Law Review, 33 J. LEGAL EDUC.
14 (1986) (faculty provides more guidance than law review members admit).
38. Rothstein & Rothstein, supra note 37. Compare Rotunda, Law Reviews-The Ex-
treme Centrist Position, 62 IND. L.J. 1, 2 & n.4 (1986) (recounting some classic misjudgments
by law review editors such as Harvard Law Review's rejection of Dean Prosser's The Assault
Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960)) and Cramton,
American Law Review, supra note 8, at 7-8 & nn.30-31 (more horror stories, including faculty
intervention to prevent H.L.A. Hart from withdrawing Positivism and the Separation of Law
and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593 (1958), over editing dispute) with Kester, supra note 37, at
[Vol. 39
with expertise, for ' any lack of expertise is virtually inconsequential. The
true jewels almost inevitably get published somewhere. Even if most of
the selections that students publish are no more than "polished turds,"
the legal community is free to ignore them and delve straight for the
jewel in the heap.
39
The recent emergence of several faculty-edited law reviews is at least
partially responsive to the power of the student-run law reviews. There
is little danger that the former will replace the latter,4° however, if for no
other reason than that there are not enough faculty-edited law reviews to
absorb even a fraction of the law faculty's scholastic inundation.
41
Whether or not they are good at what they do, the students can for the
time being feel secure in exercising their considerable power.
As leverage against the administration, the law review can capitalize
on the administration's perpetual obsession with its own reputation and
the law school's stature, both of which are affected by the perceived qual-
ity of the law review. Against both faculty and administration, the law
review has a power, no different in kind (although certainly in degree)
from that of the press, to influence the faculty's or administration's fu-
ture conduct. The law review can threaten to expose the oppressive pow-
ers to the world.42 In short, a well-organized law review seems free to
make waves, if not demands, with considerable impunity.43
It is fair to question exactly how much leverage these unique con-
frontational powers afford the law review. After all, the proliferation of
law reviews limits the potency of a law review's capacity to discriminate
among authors. Moreover, it is hard to imagine what damage a law re-
14-15 (counter-examples including faculty's opposition to publication of Reich, Mr. Justice
Black and the Living Constitution, 76 HARV. L. REv. 673 (1963)). Some doubt law students'
competence to perform even the most primitive editorial functions of "warrant[ing] that cita-
tions are in the correct citation form; that the spelling, grammar and punctuation are correct;
that citations and quotes are correct; that cases have been Shepardized for currency; that state-
ments are substantively accurate; that the coverage is thorough; and that the reasoning is
sound." Rothstein & Rothstein, supra note 37.
39. See Rotunda, supra note 38, at 7-9. I have expropriated the term "polished turds"
from a prominent judge who shall remain nameless.
40. Id. at 6-7 & n.19. But cf Cramton, American Law Review, supra note 8, at 10 (while
law review is currently secure, its has doubtful future).
41. See Ellman, A Comparison of Law Faculty Production in Leading Law Reviews, 33 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 681, 682 (1983) (surveying 1286 faculty pieces published in student-edited law
reviews in two and one-half year period, which occupied 44,411 pages and 175,415 footnotes).
42. Other student-run entities, and even ad hoc groups of students, could also publicize
the acts of faculty and administration to their embarrassment, but no other student entity has
the law review's pre-existing apparatus or ready-made audience.
43. While other student entities might organize and make demands, they have less lever-
age. Organization of a student boycott or strike, for example, is hardly a credible threat.
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view could inflict on the institutional reputation that would not also re-
dound to the law review's detriment.
There are several responses. In the first place, neither of these limi-
tations diminishes the law review's single greatest weapon, the combined
power of the press and access to an audience. Second, even if these quali-
fications weaken the potency of the weapon they do not negate it entirely.
The power to select articles is still worth something as against the many
law professors who submit to affiliated law reviews;44 the power to tar-
nish the administration's or even the school's stature is still worth some-
thing, when to do so would not also harm the law review. Third, neither
limitation is inevitable or insurmountable. For example, the apparent
limitation to the article-selection power depends on the provincial as-
sumption that law reviews are confined to their own little law school
communities. There is nothing in theory to prevent various law reviews
from coordinating article-selection efforts, thereby increasing the lever-
age of each. Finally, quite apart from the strength of the suggested pow-
ers, their very existence fosters a feeling of greater autonomy. The
knowledge that one can diminish, however imperceptibly, the power of a
dominating force is itself dealienating.
b. Affirmative Dealienation
In contrast to the negative mechanisms of dealienation, affirmative
dealienation can be accomplished without reference to administration or
faculty powers, because its purpose is not to diminish the power of either
group vis-d-vis the student body. Rather, it is aimed at independently
promoting among students a sense of self-worth and belonging in what
might otherwise be (and in the worst-case scenario is sure to be) a demor-
alizing and impersonal experience.
Again, the law review is, in conception, well suited to the task. It is
the most truly communal activity in the law school environment, an ac-
tivity that could foster comradery rather than competition among stu-
dents.45 In order to publish a decent product, the members have no
44. According to a recent study, the major law reviews publish disproportionately the
work of affiliated faculty. Ellman, supra note 41, at 692. The most dramatic example was the
University of Virginia faculty, which in a two and one-half year period collectively published
1323 of 1926 pages in the Virginia Law Review. Id. at 688-89. A likely explanation (the valid-
ity of which the survey could not assess) is that "there is a significant relaxation of normal
evaluative procedures for home faculty submissions." Id. at 692.
45. Two other candidates are the study group and the clinic. The study group members
rely heavily upon one another, but there are almost invariably strong undercurrents of compe-
tition. See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text (discussing mutual distrust among law
students). The clinic might be more cooperative, but there, too, an undercurrent of competi-
tion is likely to exist. After all, everyone gets a grade; they cannot all be A's.
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choice but to unite. Distrust need not underlie the cooperation, as it does
in other student settings. First, the law review's members are not merely
united against what might be perceived at times as a common enemy in
the classroom. Instead, they must work hard toward a common goal: to
create a product that bears their names and reflects their collective iden-
tity. Second, there is no internal, systemic influence comparable to
grades that pits one member against the other. In contrast to the study-
group setting, for example, the good of the individual corresponds to the
good of the collective.
The creative focus of the law review means that the member has
more to show for her work than a few numbers on a computerized tran-
script. There is a concrete final product that the student may claim as
her own. This concretization of the work effort stands in stark contrast
to the seeming futility of an endless succession of law school lectures and
examinations. Moreover, because so many prominent scholars and ju-
rists say so, the student can truly believe that the product makes a
difference.
46
Finally, evaluation in the ideal law review is done by peers who the-
oretically are equally concerned with the final product. They are not aus-
tere authority figures who are perceived as aloof and abusive. The
evaluation is constructive, frequent, and based upon factors that are
within the student's control. It is a far cry from the scarcity of feedback
and the futility and seeming arbitrariness that may be said to character-
ize the rest of the law school experience. Ideally, the goal of the law
review evaluative process is to perfect a product, not to perpetuate a
ranking. The very notion of a ranking should be foreign to the evalua-
tion of students' law review work. Every student submission may be
published if it meets the law review's standards of quality. Accordingly,
no piece is ever rejected with the finality of a law school grade, and the
student author should feel as if she were working with, not against, her
law review authority figure.
B. Creativity and Intellectualism
The law school has been described by some as a downright anti-
46. See, eg., Douglas, Law Reviews and Full Disclosure, 40 WASH. L. REV. 227, 228
(1965); Hoffman, Law Review and the Bench, 51 Nw. L. REV. 17 (1956); Traynor, To the
Right Honorable Law Reviews, 10 UCLA L. REV. 3 (1962); Warren, Message of Greeting to the
U.C.L.A. Law Review, I UCLA L. REV. 1 (1953); see also Rotunda, supra note 38, at 4 n.9
(compiling references on importance of law review scholarship to development of law);
Swygert & Bruce, supra note 10, at 739 n.5 (same). While some may disagree, it is sufficient
for my purposes to note that students are given ample reason to believe that law reviews make
valuable contributions.
intellectual environment that stifles creativity-"a three-year stopover
(lightened by one or two lucrative summer associateships) on the way to
a big-dollar business rather than an intellectual introduction to a profes-
sion."'4 7 These characteristics both exacerbate and reflect the student
alienation just described. To the extent that law school suppresses stu-
dents' creativity and relegates intellectual pursuits to a position of inci-
dental importance, students sense a certain futility; to the extent that
they find the law school environment oppressive, students are unlikely to
make the most of the intellectual and creative opportunities that the law
school does offer. Realization of the law review's dealienating potential
could incidentally reverse some of the perceived anti-intellectualism of
the law school. More importantly, the law review, with its creative and
intellectual focus, could directly spur its members' intellectual
development.
(1) Speculations on Anti-creative and Anti-intellectual Forces
in the Law School
If the law school is anti-intellectual and creativity-stifling it is not
because the incoming students expect it to be. To be sure, many students
are uncertain why they are in law school and a good many go by default.
Whatever their motives, most undoubtedly expect an intellectual chal-
lenge. They expect also to be forced to see things in a new light and to
use their ingenuity to seek new solutions to old problems. Like most
outsiders, they envision law school as "a place for dialogue, for reflection,
for definition and comparison of values."' 48 Thus, if the law school is
anti-intellectual or if it stifles creativity, that must be because something
happens between orientation and graduation. The possibilities include:
(1) the emphasis of the credential value of law school over the experience
of legal training; (2) the perceived marginality of the law school curricu-
47. Brill, Harvard Drivel, Am. Law., Oct. 1982, at 1, 9; see also id. ("students ... don't
care all that much about the education they are getting compared with the credentials they are
buying"); Margolick, The Trouble with America's Law Schools, N.Y. Times, May 22, 1983, § 6
(Magazine), at 21; Stevens, Law Schools and Law Students, 59 VA. L. REV. 551, 553 (1973)
("[Tihe popular conception of law school life as a mixture of long hours pouring over
casebooks and endless discussion is more myth than reality. By the fifth semester, many stu-
dents have the equivalent of a two-day work week and discuss their studies rarely, if at all.")
48. Cramton, Demysitifying, supra note 19, at 2 (citation omitted). Cramton continues:
It is a special place, a unique resource. Here there can be gathered a community
of scholars with the luxury of time, the support of colleagues, and the devotion to
inquiry that are the essential predicate for the development of new ideas and values
concerning law, legal institutions, and the never-ending quest for justice.
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lum; and (3) the spurning of intellectualism and creativity by those who
were disappointed with their first-year performance.
a. Credential vs. Experience
An intellectually enriching experience is not the law students' only
expectation. Each is fully aware of the credential value of a law degree
that represents for most a personal, and for many a familial, advance-
ment up the social ladder. Of course, the law degree's credential value is
not inherently incompatible with a worthwhile intellectual and creative
experience. Through three phenomena, however, the credential depreci-
ates the experience. First, over the course of the law school tenure, the
credential's value grows increasingly concrete, enticing law students into
a competition for prestige. Second, it becomes clear that the credential
value of the law degree is roughly proportional to the grade-point aver-
age (GPA), so that those who seek prestige become obsessed with grades.
Finally, pursuit of prestige through the credential is to some extent sys-
temically incompatible with the pursuit of intellectual experience
through law school.
The corporate law firm exerts the most powerful force toward con-
cretization of the law-degree credential. Law firms go to great lengths
and expense to recruit the potential recipients of law degrees. The sum-
mer program entices law students with a taste of the "good life," replete
with cruises and dream nights. Law firms offer salaries that are triple the
student's highest pre-law school salary and many times the student's per-
ceived self-worth. With all law firms looking and sounding the same,
students compare law firms largely (though, in all fairness, not entirely)
on the basis of the salaries, perks, and prestige they offer. The entice-
ment of law-firm prestige convinces students of the value of the creden-
tial they are earning; if bidders are willing to pay so high a price for a law
school graduate, the theory goes, then the credential must be extraordi-
narily valuable. Moreover, it becomes apparent that the only really pres-
tigious route is the corporate law firm; otherwise other entities such as
public defenders, government agencies, and public-interest firms would
be as visible, would offer equally competitive salaries and perks, and
would be actively promoted by law school placement offices.
Of course, not everyone gets recruited by law firms and the most
prestigious ones only interview a handful of students. The competition is
fierce. It becomes clear that the law degree is not the ultimate credential.
The prestigious law firms are competing for the top of the class. The
more prestigious the firm, the finer the layer of cream they attempt to
skim off the top. Grades take on a whole new significance. Some stu-
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dents might continue to value grades as a reflection of legal knowledge,
but grades are at least as important as a route to prestige. Thus, studying
becomes a step toward financial and social advancement in addition to
(or instead of) an activity that is inherently worthwhile.
Finally, as the system is arranged, the pursuit of prestige is, as a
practical matter, often incompatible with an intellectual and creative ex-
perience. Students interrupt or miss classes for on-campus interviews.
They miss full days or even weeks of school for fly-backs. The choice to
forego class for job opportunities reflects student values: lining up a posi-
tion with a prestigious law firm is more important than learning the law
and far more important than making law study creative. It is not entirely
their fault. The system is such that students have virtually no choice but
to make the value judgment they make. From the outset, there is strong
systemic pressure to seek a position with a high-prestige law firm. The
only way to get the job is to play the law firm game. And the only way to
play the game right, as the system is arranged, is to miss class for inter-
views and fly-backs and pass up whatever nominally creative opportuni-
ties the law school offers.
49
The continuing incentive to earn high grades also fails to compen-
sate for the anti-intellectual and creativity-stifling effects of the job
search. In the first place, as I demonstrate later, the grade-point average
is a poor measure of legal knowledge.5 0 There is, then, a sense in which
the time and energy spent earning high grades displace "true" scholar-
ship. Even the assumption that grades can accurately reflect legal profi-
ciency at the time the exam is taken does not necessarily lead to the
conclusion that the incentive to earn high grades reinforces intellectual-
ism. The system still encourages the student to accommodate all the de-
mands on his time by interviewing during the term and then cramming
for exams at the end. This being the case, there is little chance that profi-
ciency at the time of the exam will translate into long-term proficiency.
There is even less chance that preparation for and taking of the exam will
be a creative experience.
b. Marginality of the Law School Curriculum
Perhaps one reason students are so ready to elevate grades above the
law school curriculum is that they perceive the former but not the latter
as relevant to the real world. Perhaps they can sense what some com-
49. It would be easy enough for schools to set aside an interview week so that students do
not miss class time. The week could be made up at the end of the school year. Yale Law
School and Columbia Law School, for example, have instituted such a practice.
50. See infra notes 101-06 and accompanying text.
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mentators describe as the "marginality" of the law school curriculum, 51
perceiving the curriculum's predominantly doctrinal and value-neutral
focus as mostly beside the point.52 The pursuit of the "true meaning" of
cases and the often senseless search for patterns that explain them may
be thought to ignore, and indeed obfuscate, more important issues such
as the legitimacy of the doctrine's underlying assumptions.5 3 If a partic-
ular law student perceives the curriculum as a process of enshrouding the
truly relevant issues in doctrinal smog, he is likely to grow impatient
with or cynical about what others call intellectualism.
54
The problem is that upon rejecting legal doctrine, students may have
nothing to put in its place. If professors do not discuss and encourage
independent consideration of alternative views, and a fortiori if they af-
firmatively discourage such endeavors, the students are left with an intel-
lectual void. In the end, they simply tune out, opting to focus their
energies on other endeavors such as part-time work.
55
c. Agony of Defeat Among Overachievers
A third possible explanation of the anti-intellectualism that infects
law students is the demoralization of students who fail to reach the top of
the class. Students who enter law school are accustomed to being at the
top. As noted above, they are therefore likely to internalize their
grades.56 Those who do poorly in law school readily attribute their per-
formance to intellectual inferiority, just as they once comfortably attrib-
uted their high undergraduate grades to intellectual superiority. 57 The
51. Tushnet, Legal Scholarship: Its Causes and Cure, 90 YALE L.J. 1205, 1205 (1981)
(making charge of "marginality" against legal scholarship generally); see Halpern, supra note
1, at 384-88 (case-law method precludes consideration of fundamental questions); Kennedy,
Hierarchy, supra note 1, at 46-50 (on formal law curriculum).
52. See, e.g., Kairys, Legal Reasoning, in THE POLITICS OF LAW, supra note 1, at 11; cf.
Kennedy, Liberal Values in Legal Education, 10 NOvA L.J. 603, 608-10 (1986) [hereinafter
Kennedy, Liberal Values] (distinguishing between "doctrinal" and "value-neutral" teaching
methods).
53. Cf Cramton, Professional Education in Medicine and Law: Structural Differences,
Common Failings, Possible Opportunities, 34 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 349, 354 (1986) (describing
process by which law curriculum discourages self-learning and intellectual curiosity).
54. See Feinman & Feldman, Pedagogy, supra note 18, at 878-79 (indeterminacy of law
and irrelevance of morality to legal reasoning leave students cynical).
55. Cf Pipkin, Moonlighting in Law School: A Multischool Study of Part-Time Employ-
ment of Full-Time Students, 1982 AM. B. FOUND. REs. J. 1109.
56. See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text (discussing internalization of grades).
57. It is common knowledge among law professors that a student's first-year grades will
often influence the student's continued class participation. Decreased participation among
those with lower grades is most likely traceable to a decline in their perception of their own
scholastic worth.
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system then reinforces that perception because the jobs that are deemed
most desirable are beyond their reach.
The self-perception becomes self-fulfilling. A student who perceives
herself as unintellectual and uncreative is unlikely to spend much time
doing what the system tells her she does poorly. She is likely to reject
intellectual discourse, at least the law school community's brand of it,
and focus more on redemption in the legal community once she leaves
law school.
(2) The Law Review's Intellectual and Creative Potential
Observers might reasonably disagree as to the intellectual value of
the law school experience and the extent to which each of the factors
discussed suppresses that value. It cannot be gainsaid, however, that a
greater emphasis on the intellectual and creative aspects of legal scholar-
ship would be beneficial. The law review could offer opportunities for
such enrichment, less tainted by the forces that undermine it in the law
school curriculum.
The law review experience is by nature conducive to both creativity
and intellectual discourse. Its function, to produce and disseminate legal
scholarship, virtually compels such a focus. Article selection should de-
mand substantive analysis of legal arguments and probing inquiry into
the validity of their underlying assumptions. Editing should involve both
a painstaking analysis of that substance and a keen sense of style. Scruti-
nizing the work of others is a useful way to develop one's own writing
and analytical skills. The student editor grows sensitive to problems that
might otherwise go unnoticed in his own writing. More importantly, he
is exposed to a variety of ideas, styles, and subjects that he could inte-
grate into his own work. Finally, the writing program should force stu-
dents to think creatively and rigorously. Since each activity is conducted
by a group with a common goal-the production of the best possible
product-all members are theoretically involved at all stages of the intel-
lectual debate and the creative process.
Significantly, the anti-intellectual influences inherent in the law
school curriculum could be substantially eliminated from the law review.
To the extent that the student writer or editor becomes frustrated by the
marginality of legal doctrine, his law review experience can focus on
those issues he perceives as relevant. Input from professors could readily
be solicited to help fill the void that remains if the student rejects doc-
trine. And since the law review is not subject to direct professorial con-
trol such lines of analysis cannot be effectively discouraged. The student
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could be constantly bombarded with the newest ideas as articles from
scholars flow in submitted for publication.
Unlike in the formal law school curriculum, the credential value of
law review need not undermine its intellectual value. Of course, if the
law review experience as described above were open to all students, or
made an academic requirement, the law review would have no independ-
ent credential value. The students' performance in the activity would be
determined largely by their desire to benefit from the experience. There
would not be as powerful an incentive to perform for the sake of future
advancement or prestige. 58 Rather, the point would be to benefit from
the experience for its own intrinsic value.
Even a law review that is exclusive, and therefore more likely to be
regarded as a credential, can be structured so that its credential is com-
patible with a worthwhile intellectual experience. The insulation of law
review work from the grading scheme means that once students join law
review, they are more likely to engage in the activity for the sake of the
experience than for its credential value. Accordingly one might expect
law review to be less conducive to the type of competition that grades
engender in law school classes. Instead, a close-knit group of students,
united by the common goal of putting out the best product possible, can
focus entirely on how best to achieve that goal.
The very exclusivity and concomitant credential value of the law
review could begin to undo student dejection upon less-than-stellar law
school performance. If the law review selection process is based on
something other than grades, students who did not perform well on law
school exams could redeem themselves while still in law school rather
than reserving redemption for post-graduation. Having proven them-
selves to be intellectually competent in other respects, they could find less
reason to spurn intellectual endeavors.
C. Reactionism and Activism
We have already seen that pursuit of either intellectual stimulation
or prestige may motivate the student to go to law school. Most students
also come to law school with some sense of mission. They often have
58. This may not be entirely true. If the law review were purely voluntary, its members
would join primarily out of genuine interest in the experience. If, however, the law review
experience were a mandatory part of the curriculum, it would most likely be plagued by the
same problems that infect every other aspect of the law school curriculum. To subject law
review work to grades would divert its members' attention away from legal scholarship, result-
ing in the same anti-intellectualism that infects law school curriculum generally. To exempt
the mandatory law review from grades, however, would encourage students to sacrifice the full
experience for the all-important GPA.
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aspirations of social and political reform, envisioning the law as some-
thing more than a mere profession. Duncan Kennedy identifies two such
aspirations: a progressive "service through the law" 59 and a more radical
turning of the superstructural tables on those who dominate through
law.60 Just as law students may be disappointed by an anti-intellectual
environment, they may also find that law school is less conducive, or
even hostile, to social or political action (or their vision of such action)
than they anticipated.
Not everyone would characterize all or any such repression 6' as nec-
essarily undesirable. To the extent that it is, however, the law review
once again has considerable potential to counter that repression and act
affirmatively on political or social issues.
(1) Law School Repression and Law Firm Reactionism
Of course, the law school does not politically repress all students.
To the extent that it does, an attempt to posit a single pattern of political
repression would be patently simplistic. Nevertheless, two general obser-
vations might shed some light on the source of any such repression. The
first relates to the law school curriculum's apparent, and apparently false,
neutrality and its tendency to indoctrinate. The second is the law
school's tendency to funnel its students into the corporate law firm.
62
a. False Neutrality and "Indoctrination"
When the law school pretends to be "barren of theoretical ambition
or practical vision of what social life might be,"' 63 the neutrality is only
superficial. It can scarcely be disputed that law schools are, in fact, ex-
traordinarily political. I have already noted a possible manifestation and
a concomitant result of that apparent, but false, neutrality. The manifes-
59. Kennedy, Hierarchy, supra note 1, at 41 (attributing notion to Justice Brandeis).
60. See id. (in the "more radical notion .. .the student sees herself as part technician,
part judo expert, able to turn the tables exactly because she never lets herself be mystified by
the rhetoric that is so important to other students"); Garth, Independent Professional Power
and the Search for a Legal Ideology with a Progressive Bite, 62 IND. L.J. 183, 187 (1987) (doc-
trine can be useful in bringing about progressive or radical agenda because "[l]awyers get
listened to in many forums when they can ground their position in accepted legal doctrines").
61. The word "repression" is itself loaded with negative connotations. A better alterna-
tive might be "deterrence."
62. This section borrows heavily from Feinman & Feldman, Pedagogy, supra note 18, at
876-78; Halpern, supra note 1, at 386-94; and Kennedy, Hierarchy, supra note 1, at 41-44, 59-
61. They each address the effects discussed here as if they were the inevitable product of the
law school. I do not go that far here. Rather, I discuss the effects as possible pitfalls of legal
education.
63. Kennedy, Hierarchy, supra note 1, at 40; cf Cramton, Demystifying, supra note 19, at
7 ("Much legal scholarship pretends to an objectivity it does not deliver ....").
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tation is the curriculum's emphasis on doctrine to the exclusion of the
fundamental political judgments that underlie it. A potential result is
student disillusion with, and wholesale rejection of, the law school
curriculum.64
The false neutrality could also trigger effects that extend far beyond
the classroom. Most obvious is an effect that, for convenience and for
lack of a better word with a less negative connotation, can be labeled
"indoctrination." First, the law school discourages resort to arguments
based upon the student's sense of intuitive morality or justice as not suffi-
ciently developed or authoritative to persuade. Second, since most stu-
dents believe that legal doctrine reflects some sort of intuitive morality,
they may feel comfortable abandoning as naive their view of justice and
opting for the view that legal doctrine reflects.
If one accepts the hypothesis that doctrine conceals underlying
political judgments, the result of such a disproportionate focus on doc-
trine is to legitimate the status quo. Of course, a certain measure of doc-
trine is indispensable, even if the student's sole aspiration is to change
that doctrine radically. Facility with doctrine is the very basis of Ken-
nedy's radical table-turning. But the more willing a student is to accept
doctrinal analysis as the sole input into the resolution of a legal issue, the
more likely he is to abandon his sense of "justice" as a check on the
result that doctrine compels, or worse, to rationalize a result that initially
struck him as unjust.65
In short, the indoctrination threatens to change the way students
look at the world. A changed perspective is not inherently undesirable so
long as it results from even-handed scrutiny of all relevant positions. The
law school indoctrination, however, changes the student's views not by
opening her eyes to new ideas, but by narrowing her focus to ir-
relevancies or, at best, "marginalities." In the end, the more tolerant a
student becomes of injustice in the name of the rule of law, the more
likely she is to acquiesce in, perhaps even to advance, the very "evils"
that she entered law school to change.
64. This observation might be extrapolated to the law school years generally. Perhaps
law students are simply too busy, or perhaps the study of law so legitimates the status quo that
the student abandons her thoughts of change. Whatever the reason, law students tend to re-
frain from participation in either community or law school politics.
65. Cramton's observations on legal scholarship are readily adaptable to legal education:
Proposals for reform in traditional legal scholarship are limited and meliorist,
since they take present arrangements for granted. Although rarely stated, the tacit
assumption is that our system (minor blemishes aside) is as good as it is reasonable to
expect a civilized society to have become at this stage of human history.
Cramton, Demystifying, supra note 19, at 11.
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b. The Law School and Law Firm Reactionism
If there is any truth to the foregoing discussion of law student indoc-
trination it can begin to explain both the law student's eagerness to join
the corporate law firm and her complacency once there.66 Imagine that
the law student who once contemplated service through law or radical
inversion of hierarchies becomes convinced, through indoctrination or
otherwise, that the world is indeed as just as it can be. She will feel
satisfied to abandon her earlier visions of social and political change for a
more lucrative and prestigious position with a law firm.
In fact, the student need not abandon "service through the law" as a
guiding aspiration. That aspiration, as redefined, might be compatible,
indeed synonymous, with law firm practice. If "service through the law"
means furthering one's sense of justice, then a student who perceives the
status quo as just may feel compelled to preserve it. Reaction to that
perception could mean joining forces with an institution, like the corpo-
rate law firm, that is itself firmly rooted in the status quo, if not down-
right reactionary.
Other pressures, both within and without the law school, also steer
the student in the corporate law firm's direction. The external pressures
stem from the opulence and prestige associated with the law firm. As
noted earlier, even a student motivated by neither could easily convince
herself that the money and prestige reflect the inherent worthiness of law
firm practice as a career option.
The law school reinforces-some say, practically necessitates-that
conclusion in three ways. 67 First, intentionally or not, it conveys an im-
plicit message that law firm practice is the most desirable career option.
Its placement office concentrates most of its efforts on law firm inter-
views, offering little guidance on other alternatives. Its curriculum has a
decidedly corporate bent. Second, the prevailing law school culture
teaches the student to associate the megafirm with success, since that is
where the prestige, power, and money are.
Third, law school simply does not prepare students to be much more
than apprentices in the law firm hierarchy. 68 New graduates are not
66. See generally Kagan & Rosen, On the Social Significance of Large Law Firm Practice.
37 STAN. L. REV. 399 (1985) (discussing images of large firm practice and hypotheses on how
it is changing).
67. See Foster, supra note 1, at 178, 185 (law school trains students to adjust behavior to
requirements of stratified job market; "doing any sort of law can begin to take precedence over
pursuing employment in tune with one's largely irrelevant service-oriented aspirations") (em-
phasis in original); Kennedy, Polemic, supra note 15, at 81-82. See generally supra note 62
(citing articles that discuss funneling of law students into law firm).
68. Judge Bazelon made a similar observation in discussing the quality of legal represen-
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ready, at least not by virtue of anything law school has taught them, to
open up shop on their own.69 Nor do they have much to offer public-
interest or government employers, which reserve most of their positions
for more experienced graduates. The explanations for the inadequacy of
legal training are varied, but the apologists for the law school curriculum
have at least two. Some maintain that the law school's emphasis is inten-
tional: law school's objective is not to teach students technical skills,
which are readily acquired in practice, but to instill in them a certain
method of "thinking like a lawyer," which is not.70 Others blame the
tation in criminal cases: "Law schools do not teach students how to try criminal cases....
Unlike his Wall Street counterpart, whose firm provides a closely supervised apprenticeship
period, the neophyte criminal lawyer is not apt to find such on-the-job training programs."
Bazelon, The Defective Assistance of Counsel, 42 U. CIN. L. REv. 1, 13-14 (1973).
69. Jay Feinman points out that:
no knowledgeable observer would argue that on graduation day the great majority of
law school graduates are well-equipped to enter the practice of law possessing a satis-
factory base of theoretical and technical knowledge, professional skill, and the ability
to quickly and effectively acquire other knowledge and skills as needed.
Feinman, Failure, supra note 1, at 740-41 (footnote omitted); see also Committee to Consider
Standards for Admission to Practice in the Federal Courts, FinalReport to the Judicial Confer-
ence of the United States, 83 F.R.D. 215, 219 (1979) (nearly 300 federal district court judges
surveyed rated 25% of lawyers less than "good"); Lederman & Levenson, Dealing with the
Limits of Vision: The Planning Process and the Education of Lawyers, 62 N.Y.U. L. REv. 404,
404 (1987); Meltsner, Healing the Breach: Harmonizing Legal Practice and Education, 11 VT.
L. REv. 377 (1986) (discussing shortcomings of legal education and Vermont Law School's
new program to rectify); see generally ABA SECTION OF LEGAL EDUCATION AND ADMIS-
SIONS TO THE BAR, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE TASK FORCE ON LAWYER
COMPETENCY: THE ROLE OF THE LAW SCHOOLS 3 (1979) ("recommendations ... designed
to improve the quality of law school training for the profession"); F. ZEMANS & V. ROSEN-
BLUM, THE MAKING OF A PUBLIC PROFESSION 132-33 (1981) ("Although formal law school
trianing is the virtual prerequisite for admission to the bar, it is an open question just how
much and in what ways it prepares its graduates for practice."); Baird, A Survey of the Rele-
vance of Legal Training to Law School Graduates, 29 J. LEGAL EDUC. 264 (1978) (statistical
analysis demonstrates that law school graduates commonly believe that aspects of their traing-
ing were inadequate).
70. David Cavers described lawyerly thinking as an "insight . . .into the way legal
problems arise and the processes by which lawyers and courts and legislatures have been seek-
ing to solve them." Cavers, Legal Education in the United States, in TALKS ON AMERICAN
LAW 193 (H. Berman ed. 1961). Derek Bok, in a highly controversial indictment pf the Amer-
ican law school, criticized the thinking-like-a-lawyer rationale:
[O]ne can admire the virtues of careful analysis and still believe that the times cry out
for more than these traditional skills .... [T]he capacity to think like a lawyer has
produced many triumphs, but it has also helped to produce a legal system that is
among the most expensive and least efficient in the world.
Bok, A Flawed System of Law Practice and Training, 33 J. LEGAL EDUC. 570, 582 (1983);
accord Feinman, Failure, supra note 1, at 741 (critical of explanation that law schools designed
only to "provide fundamental knowledge about legal doctrines and institutions" and that "the
rest of what lawyers do-whether regarded as significant or derided as 'how to find the court-
house'-can be acquired in the course of practice."); Mudd, Thinking Critically About "Think-
ing Like a Lawyer'" 33 J. LEGAL EDUC. 704 (1983).
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failure on the students: "[flaw schools do not fail to teach, . . . students
fail to learn. ' 71 More cynical commentators trace the phenomenon in
part to the historical interdependence of the law school and the law
firm,7 2 and in part to the long-standing institutional schism between legal
educators and legal practice.
7 3
So far, I have discussed the funneling of law students into the corpo-
rate law firm as a manifestation of the law school's political repression of
students. Accordingly, the objections discussed have targeted not the re-
sult but the process. This process is objectionable to the extent that the
student's decision to join the ranks of the corporate law firm is contami-
nated by indoctrination or societal and institutional pressures, or is trace-
able to incompetence or inability to choose otherwise.
Quite apart from the procedural taint, many observers find the re-
sult itself objectionable.7 4 If the law school has not duped a particular
student-or does not ordinarily dupe students-into abandoning the ide-
als of public service or political action, some commentators protest that
the law firm will likely succeed in doing so.75 The law firm reverses the
young lawyer's aspirations of political reform by placing him in an envi-
ronment that is itself reactionary.7 6 Affiliation with a law firm mutes
opposition to the system that supports it.77 At the very least, the law
firm tends to crowd out those goals by pressuring the associate to bill so
71. See Feinman, Failure, supra note 1, at 743 (criticizing that view as "a typical ploy-
blaming the victims").
72. The symbiotic relationship is described basically as follows: The law school needs the
big-name law firm to establish its own prestige. The law firm needs the law school to funnel
students to its offices. Thus, the law school trains students to be (and to realize they are)
technically and emotionally unprepared for anything but law firm practice. In return the law
firm makes the law school prestigious by hiring its graduates.
On the historical integration of law school into the network of corporate and financial
power, see Chase, Lawyer Training in the Age of the Department Store, 78 Nw. L. REV. 893,
898 n.16 (1979) (reviewing R. STEVENS, supra note 1).
73. Chief Justice Rehnquist, by no means a radical left-winger, has wondered about the
schism: "Law school faculties have preferred to devote themselves, by and large, to criticism
and analysis of legal doctrine .... But one wonders whether some of the emphasis of law
school study and research might not profitably be shifted to the broad area of how legal serv-
ices are delivered .... Rehnquist, The Legal Profession Today, 62 IND. L.J. 151, 152 (1987).
Feinman explains the phenomenon and its historical sources at length. See Feinman, Failure,
supra note 1, at 744-47. He blames the poor quality of legal education on the historical lack of
a constituency for quality education. "The law school provides profit and prestige for the
university, but the quality of education it delivers is largely irrelevant to the amount of profit
or prestige it receives. From the law faculty's perspective, personal and professional prestige
are, for the most part, unrelated to the performance of graduates." Id. at 747.
74. See, e.g., D. KENNEDY, LEGAL EDUCATION, supra note 29, at 70-71, 78-80.
75. Id. at 69-70.
76. Id.
77. See Cramton, Demystifying, supra note 19, at 12 ("It is... natural for lawyers not to
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many hours that she has no time to pursue anything else.
78
My caveat to the other criticisms of the law school applies equally
here. It is not my intention to take a definitive position on the extent to
which the law school and the law firm repress those political and social
aspirations that might have motivated the student to enter law school. I
note only, as I have previously, that there is a certain amount of truth to
the charges of repression.
(2) The Law Review as Political Actor
The law review's every action, like those of the law school institu-
tion generally, is infused with political significance. Its acquiescence in
the law school's politically repressive tendencies and its failure to take
affirmative political action reinforce that repression. Like the law re-
view's dealienating potential, its power to counter political repression has
"negative" and "affirmative" elements.
a. Negative Elements: Deprograming and Disrupting the Funnel
One way to promote activism is to counter those factors in the law
school that repress it. I have already noted how the law review may
encourage perspectives that diverge from the law school curriculum,
thereby militating against the anti-intellectual effect of the law school
experience. To the extent that the law school curriculum indoctrinates
by narrowing the focus to irrelevancies or "marginalities," the law review
could reverse-in essence, "deprogram" 79-that effect by fostering new
ideas and emphasizing the fundamental judgments on which doctrine is
based.
If law school indoctrination funnels law students into the law firm
by changing their perception of "service through the law," the law re-
view's deprograming effects could incidentally disrupt that funneling
raise fundamental questions about the justice of the system that provides them with relative
prestige and wealth."); Halpern, supra note 1, at 390.
78. Chief Justice Rehnquist, alluding to this phenomenon, queried, "Does such an associ-
ate have time to be anything but an associate lawyer in that large firm?" Rehnquist, supra note
73, at 153 (emphasis in original).
At the time I practiced law there was always a public aspect to the profession,
and most lawyers... felt that they could contribute something to the community in
which they lived .... It seems to me that the law firm that requires an associate to
bill in excess of two thousand hours per year ... sharply curtail[s] the productive
expenditure of energy outside of work.
Id.
79. Like the word "indoctrination," I use "deprogram" for lack of an equally descriptive
word with less derogatory connotations.
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process. But the law review could do even more to disrupt that funneling
actively.
First, the law review editorial board is well-situated to spread a
double message to its members: (1) the mere fact that law firms are the
only path that the law school promotes does not make it the most desira-
ble, and (2) law firm opulence and prestige do not accurately reflect the
inherent worthiness of a law firm career. Of course, the law review lead-
ers would have to learn that dual message before they conveyed it. This
would not be too difficult. The law review has at its disposal a list of
alumni, dating back to volume one. It could readily tap that considera-
ble source of insight into various career options. Once individual law
review members begin to act on that message and take alternate career
paths, the message will become more powerful; actions, after all, speak
louder than words. More importantly, the message could become unnec-
essary. As more top students opt out of the law firm track, its prestige
will decline.
Second, the law review could attempt to prepare students for some-
thing other than the law firm apprenticeship. Certainly the law review
could do more than merely teach students to "think like a lawyer." Most
obviously, it could hone technical research and writing skills that are
essential to practice. Moreover, there is nothing that restricts law re-
views to those skills that are involved in the publication process. They
could easily direct some of their attention to such skills as negotiation,
advocacy, and even the routine details of law practice.
b. Affirmative Elements: Law Review Activism
In addition to negating specifically whatever politically repressive
forces might exist in the law school experience, the law review could be a
formidable political actor. Those same confrontational powers that it
theoretically could deploy against law school alienation-its anti-hierar-
chical power over faculty and administration and its power of the press-
can be directed toward the corporate law firm. The law firm heavily
woos and depends on the law review to staff its offices. Just as the law
review can convert faculty and administration dependence into law re-
view leverage, it can, independently or in collusion with other law re-
views, convert law firm dependence into leverage. Just as the law review
can undermine administration and faculty prestige through publication,
it can publicize the shortcomings of particular law firms. While deploy-
ment of all these weapons may not be necessary or even advisable, the
threat of their use affords the law review much clout.
The law review is not confined to the ivory tower. Legitimately or
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not, it is the most prestigious and probably the largest student group in
the law school. It can make demands. It can advocate particular polit-
ical positions or social reform.80
II. Preconceptions of Law Review
The law review's failure to fulfill its potential as a dealienating, intel-
lectually and creatively stimulating, and politically active institution is at
least partially attributable to its members' minimal expectations of the
institution. The preconceptions form perhaps even before the student en-
ters law school. At any rate, they harden in the course of the first year.
While students' experiences vary widely and perceptions of even identical
experiences differ, there are certain messages about law review that prac-
tically all receive.
A. The Pre-Law School Preconceptions
The negation of the law review's latent strength begins, for many
students, even before they open their casebooks to read Pennoyer v.
Neff.81 While law school administrations typically describe the law re-
view to prospective applicants in the murkiest of terms, two themes inva-
riably emerge in law school bulletins: experience and credential. 82 They
are often so inextricably intertwined that the casual reader can easily
miss their incompatibility.
Invariably, the bulletins underscore the academic benefit and pride
that law review experience fosters. At the same time, they hint at its
prestige and material value. The law review is billed as "one of the finest
avenues for legal education thus far developed."'8 3 It hones the student's
legal analysis, research, and writing skills.84 Law reviews purport to
80. Cf Garth, supra note 60 (discussing ways in which legal profession as a whole can
effect progressive reform).
81. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
82. I do not pretend to have performed a systematic survey of law school bulletins; I
merely chose forty law school bulletins randomly from the first part of the alphabet. Every
level of prestige is represented. The themes discussed below appeared in nearly every bulletin.
The only theme that seemed to be affiliated with a particular level of prestige was the theme-
which typically appeared only among the newer or less prestigious law schools-that the law
review enhances the school's credibility or stature.
83. ARIZONA STATE UNIV. COLLEGE OF LAW, THE STUDY OF LAW: 1984-86 BULLE-
TIN 21 [hereinafter ARIZONA STATE BULLETIN].
84. See BROOKLYN LAW SCHOOL 1985-86 BULLETIN 56 ("unparalleled opportunity to
refine legal research and writing skills"); 1985-86 BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO SCHOOL OF LAW
BULLETIN 13 ("intensive development of... editorial, research, and writing skills"); 1984-86
COLUMBIA UNIV. BULLETIN: SCHOOL OF LAW 99 [hereinafter COLUMBIA BULLETIN] (de-
velop "skills of scholarly research and writing"); CORNELL UNIV. ANNOUNCEMENTS: COR-
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complement substantive study by affording the student an opportunity to
"perfect knowledge ... acquired in coursework. ' ' 8 5 Others even promise
to enhance managerial skills.8 6 But law review is not just a job, it's an
adventure.8 7 While the law review "requires dedication and disci-
pline,"'88 the experience is "rewarding" 89 and will be "valuable in any
future career." 90 The student can have the satisfaction of having contrib-
uted to legal scholarship. 9 1 Furthermore, the entire legal community
recognizes law review as a valuable experience 92 and prospective employ-
ers put a premium on that experience. 93 In short, law review helps you
"be all that you can be."
"Sounds great," the prospective applicant thinks, "where do I sign
up?" The catch is that this valuable experience-which the applicant has
just been told is not only the best avenue for developing skills that are
"essential in both law school and in practice, '94 but is an integral "part
of the educational program of the Law School" 95-is reserved only for a
select few. It's not just an adventure, its a trophy. "Selection for partici-
NELL LAW SCHOOL 1985-86 30 (June 1985) [hereinafter CORNELL BULLETIN] ("training and
experience in legal research, critical analysis, and concise writing").
85. 1985-86 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW SCHOOL BULLETIN 18 [hereinafter BOSTON COL-
LEGE BULLETIN].
86. See 1986 COOLEY 52 [hereinafter COOLEY BULLETIN] (28-member law review devel-
ops "management skills necessary to run a large organization").
87. The analogy of law review "propaganda" to army advertising is irresistible. Reading
the bulletin descriptions, one can almost hear the electric riffs of the bass, working up to a
frenzied guitar crescendo, an overdubbed, overmechanical voice dictating: "Port of call, Po-
dunk Law Review. " Alternating images of eager, young scholars charging toward truth and
justice and serene moments of comradery flash before the eyes.
88. UNIV. OF CALIFORNIA 1985-86: SCHOOL OF LAW, BOALT HALL 13 (Aug. 1985).
This is the closest that any surveyed bulletin came to divulging that law review membership
entails long hours and hard work. Certainly none of them gave an inkling that the work might
be perceived as dull and devoid of intellectual value. The revelation is reserved for much later,
once the law student has already been "invited" to join. See infra notes 124-30 and accompa-
nying text (discussing possible function of invitation letters).
89. ARIZONA STATE BULLETIN, supra note 83, at 21.
90. CASE WESTERN RESERVE UNIV. SCHOOL OF LAW BULLETIN 20 (July 1985).
91. See, e.g., ARIZONA STATE BULLETIN, supra note 83, at 21 ("contributes... to the
development of law and the legal profession"); BOSTON COLLEGE BULLETIN, supra note 85, at
18 ("publish... for the benefit of the profession"); 21 CLEVELAND STATE UNIV. BULLETIN:
CLEVELAND-MARSHALL COLLEGE OF LAW 72 (July 1985) ("contribute to the legal commu-
nity by writing a scholarly article").
92. See THE AMERICAN UNIV., THE WASHINGTON COLLEGE OF LAW BULLETIN 111
(Sept. 1986) ("membership on the staff of the Law Review is recognized in the legal profession
as ... a unique educational experience").
93. BULLETIN OF BAYLOR UNIV.: THE SCHOOL OF LAW [hereinafter BAYLOR BULLE-
TIN] 15 (May 1985) ("usually considered by prospective employers to be an important factor in
the selection of graduates for employment").
94. CORNELL BULLETIN, supra note 84, at 30.
95. See COLUMBIA BULLETIN, supra note 84, at 99.
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pation on the Review," the applicant is told, "is highly competitive.
'96
The law review laurels, reserved for "exceptional students, ' 97 "a coveted
recognition of academic achievement, is one of the highest honors a stu-
dent can attain." 98 The selection process for that high honor is described
cursorily, if at all.
I do not intend to overstate the relevance of this composite descrip-
tion of the law review. In the first place, inferences drawn from such
cursory statements of purpose are weak and inferences drawn from omis-
sions are dubious. Moreover, few prospective law students read the de-
scriptions critically; no one reads them as critically as does the discussion
that follows. The bulletins may have less impact on the student's expec-
tations of law review than my discussion here might suggest. Neverthe-
less, we may consider them official pronouncements of the law review's
role. It is safe to assume that the same positions are communicated to
students through other media as well.
Even with these caveats in mind, the preliminary depiction of the
law review suggests that it is not immune from the severest criticisms of
the law school. Most obvious is the foreshadowing of two interrelated
themes-the credential-experience dialectic and evaluative falsity-that
as we already seen might be responsible, respectively, for alienation and
anti-intellectualism in the law school. More subtle is an unspoken
message that the law review is as much a conservative political actor as is
the law school generally.
(1) The Inherent Tension: Credential-Experience Dialectic
and Evaluative Falsity
The first clue that something is amiss with the bulletin's depiction of
the law review is the manner in which it juxtaposes the experience and
credential values of the law review. As I have already noted, the same
activity could quite plausibly be both a legitimate credential and a worth-
while experience. In the bulletin's description of the law review, those
elements are in subtle tension. On the one hand, the bulletins tout law
review experience as highly beneficial, if not essential, to legal practice
and scholarship. On the other hand, the experience is reserved only to
96. 81 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIV. BULLETIN: J. REUBIN CLARK LAW SCHOOL 21 (Aug.
1984).
97. BAYLOR BULLETIN, supra note 93, at 15; see COOLEY BULLETIN, supra note 86, at
52 ("outstanding students"); 44 IIT CHICAGO-KENT COLLEGE OF LAW, 1985-86 BULLETIN
69 ("students of high scholastic ability"; "selected students").
98. NORTHERN KENTUCKY UNIV. CHASE COLLEGE OF LAW, 1985-86 CATALOG 20
(Sept. 1984).
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those who have already demonstrated an exceptional mastery of legal
skills.
The tension between the credential and the experiential values of
law review is not irreconcilable. Yet to assume that one value is true
leads to a problem that can be solved only by either rejecting the other or
accepting unpalatable conclusions about the nature of the law school
experience.
We can begin with the assumption that the law review experience
enhances skills that are essential to legal practice and scholarship. Given
that assumption, two explanations for the law review's exclusivity come
to mind. First, the lawyering skills on which law review selection is
based are different from those that the law review experience enhances.
To appreciate the consequences of this explanation, we must recall that
the bulletins characterize the skills that law review experience enhances
as essential to legal practice and scholarship, and depict the law review
experience as encompassing practically every skill imaginably associated
with those pursuits. If these characterizations are accurate, law review
selection must be based on criteria that have little to do with lawyering
skills, and the credential must be false. Those who are deprived of the
credential, and concomitant experience, should feel cheated, alienated;
and those who win it should rightfully doubt their own competence.
The second explanation for the law review's exclusivity is equally
unsatisfactory. Perhaps law review selection is based on skills of the type
that law review experience enhances, but it singles out only those excep-
tional students for whom the law review experience would be worth-
while. That solution is an effective concession that the law school
experience itself (or at least the first year) is a dismal failure, for it leaves
most students so incompetent that they could not even benefit from a
program designed to enhance the skills most essential to legal practice
and scholarship. The message is one of futility, and the likely result,
again, is alienation.
The alternative to either of those explanations is to abandon alto-
gether the assumption that law review experience is relevant to legal
practice or scholarship. Assuming instead that the law review selection
process merely identifies students with superior legal abilities, the impli-
cations are no more palatable. It follows that law review membership is
nothing more than a credential. As was true in the context of the law
school generally, and as will be discussed in more detail in the next sec-
tion, the law review's credential value is enhanced only at the expense of
its intellectual and uncreative direction.
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(2) The Silent Message
So far, I have focused only on inferences to be drawn from what
bulletins expressly state. Their silence is nearly as eloquent. First, they
say little about the law review's political impact. Law review is described
as a contributor to legal scholarship, but the nature of that contribution
is left to speculation. The bulletin's failure to distinguish law review
scholarship from that which prevails in the law school curriculum sug-
gests that they are the same. To the extent that the latter is falsely neu-
tral, the former is likely to be as well. Far from deprogramming
whatever indoctrination the law school curriculum engenders, law review
participation, as depicted in the bulletins, will enhance it.
Nor do the cursory descriptions of law review evince any tendency
to divorce the law school from the corporate law firm. Perhaps the law
review's promise to develop lawyering skills will make it easier to resist
the corporate law firm funneling, at least to the extent that the funneling
is attributable to the students' incompetence to do anything else. The
bulletins, however, mention no other alternatives, much less a promise
to cultivate them.
Finally, the bulletins are utterly devoid of any reference to the polit-
ical action that the law review is so well-situated to take. As described,
the law review's realm is the ivory tower, not the political arena.
B. The First Year: Predominance and Legitimation
of the Law Review Credential
As the foregoing discussion suggests, the characterization of the law
review as both a worthwhile experience and a valid credential produces a
subtle tension. While the bulletin posed the contradiction, it provided no
basis on which to elect between those two options, or to adopt some al-
ternative solution. The first year of law school furnishes at least a partial
answer: Although most first-year students undoubtedly still assume that
the law review is a worthwhile experience, the credential value predomi-
nates in their minds and is primarily legitimated. The subordination of
the experience theme to the credential and the concurrent legitimation of
the credential nearly to the point of unassailability constitute the first
step toward undermining the law review's potential.
In part because of the first-year student's academic and social isola-
tion from her predecessors, the law review is partially enshrouded. The
sole aspect of law review that is clearly visible during the first year is the
success it symbolizes, the goal to which all can aspire and over which all
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agonize. 99 It is easy to see and appreciate the practical implications of
the law review trophy-easier access to better jobs, separatism, and
favoritism.
On the other hand, few students have any idea of what law review
work entails or that law review entails work at all. Nor does it seem to
matter. Perhaps they blindly accept the assertion that law reviews
sharpen essential skills. More likely, however, is that the credential value
of law review is broadcast so forcefully that the theme of law review as an
experience is drowned out and falls into desuetude.
The first year is the law review credential's best shot at legitimation.
For a full year, the law student can view the law review-dominated hier-
archy of upperclass students from a disinterested perspective. The first-
year student, unlike his counterparts in the second and third years, is not
competing with the law review members for prestige. Accordingly, there
is no reason to be critical of the hierarchy's legitimacy. He competes,
rather, only with other first-year students, who are on seemingly equal
footing; each one ostensibly has an equal shot at the prize.
Two factors further reinforce the putative meritocracy's legitimacy:
the identification of law review membership with accomplished scholar-
ship and the reward of law review membership. Consistently, those who
are considered accomplished scholars are affiliated with the law review.
The law fellows for first-year legal writing courses and moot court judges
are, more often than not, on a law review. Nearly all of the professors
were members in their day (or were, according to the gossip, such accom-
plished scholars that they had the gumption to turn down law review
membership). The law school conveys an unspoken message: those who
have won the prize are smarter.
The student also learns early that the system recognizes the elite
status of the law review member by rewarding her. The new law student
recognizes that law review members are treated somewhat differently.
As the year progresses, the separatism manifests itself concretely, if sub-
tly, in the perks that accrue exclusively to the law review personnel: of-
fices, free coffee, message service, and special library privileges. If
anything is obvious to the prestige-conscious law student, it is that the
prestigious law firms hire from the ranks of the law review. There is,
99. See D. KENNEDY, LEGAL EDUCATION, supra note 29, at 65 (describing law review
obsession: "most students give about equal time to fantasies of flunking out and fantasies of
grabbing the brass ring."); Aronds, Section 8, L. Weekly, Mar. 3, 1986, at 10, col. 3 (first-year
student depicts panic-stricken cartoon character who worries, "My grades are terrible com-
pared with my past achievements. Already, Law Review is becoming a distant dream.").
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then, a corollary message that the system is rewarding law review mem-
bership because it merits reward.
When that double message is explicit, it is all the more powerful.
The official imprimatur is applied, often unintentionally, by a professor
in an offhand remark regarding the value of the law review or the intelli-
gence of its members. Students who latch on to the professor's every
word take that assessment as gospel too.
That law review members are recognized as scholars and showered
with rewards is of course perfectly consistent with the conclusion that
law review accurately selects the scholars and legitimately rewards them.
It is, however, equally consistent with the more cynical conclusion that
the law review randomly selects members-some intellectuals and some
imbecils-all of whom are assumed to be scholars and worthy of reward.
Yet it is the rare first year law student who will wonder whether it is the
scholars that make law review or the law review that makes scholars-
or, more bluntly, whether the system rewards those who really have
achieved or merely licenses future achievement by randomly selecting
students to reward.
The subordination of the law review experience to the law review
credential value and the concurrent legitimation of the latter undermine
the law review's potential in two main respects. First, the student who
believes that law review membership signifies little more than a creden-
tial will expect from it little in the way of intellectual or creative stimula-
tion; law review membership will be an end only. That diminished
expectation is likely to mold reality. The student who expects less of law
review might do less to make it a worthwhile experience. He will cer-
tainly be less disappointed when the law review does not deliver the expe-
rience that the bulletin expressly promises. In short, since for a full year
he was not promised a challenging and stimulating experience, he neither
expects nor demands one when he gets there.
Second, the law student who internalizes the legitimacy of the selec-
tion process might easily believe himself to have earned the credential.
Since for a year there has been little mention of the work that the creden-
tial entails, that student is likely to be recalcitrant, even indignant, when
asked to pay for it.
III. The First Deep, Dark Secret: A False Credential
By the time the selection process begins, the meritocracy's legiti-
macy is so well established that few first-year students dare to question it.
Yet to conclude that the first year legitimates the law review meritocracy
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in the minds of law students is not to suggest that the consequent hierar-
chy is in fact legitimate.
At the risk of needlessly needling, I will start by restating the law
review's first deep, dark secret: You don't have to be that smart to be on
the law review-the credential is false. It is perhaps the deeper and
darker of the two law review secrets because, for reasons already dis-
cussed, no one seems to realize it, not even the members.
Tautologically, an ideal selection process identifies those who can
best perform the skills that they are purportedly selected to perform. In
the law review context, the legitimacy of the selection process and of the
credential it generates presumably depends on the extent to which the
process accurately identifies effective research skills, incisive legal reason-
ing, persuasive advocacy, and originality.
A survey of law review selection processes discloses three basic ave-
nues to the prize: (1) "grading-on," usually on the basis of first-year
grades; (2) "writing-on," through a one- to six-week writing competition;
and (3) "publishing-on," the submission and acceptance for publication
of a student note.l°° The first two are ill-suited to the selection task, and
the third is so rarely employed that its effect on membership is negligible.
A. Grades
The "main" law review in about half the law schools relies, at least
partially, on grades for law review selection.' 0 ' For an institution that
purports to be dedicated to scholarly writing, this focus on grades is, to
say the least, enigmatic. As I have already noted, the law school grading
100. See generally Fidler, supra note 9, at 52-54 (survey of selection processes); Wisconsin
Law Review, Survey of Law Review Selection (1981) (unpublished manuscript). Criteria con-
spicuously absent from the selection processes of most law reviews are race, ethnicity, and sex.
A handful of law reviews have adopted various affirmative action plans. See Fidler, supra note
9, at 53 (eight law reviews, or 6.3% of those surveyed, had affirmative action programs). They
have invariably been controversial. See, e.g., Cramton, American Law Review, supra note 8, at
6-7 (describing Harvard Law Review's affirmative action plan as the "fall of the citadel");
Wash. Post, Mar. 3, 1987, at A22, col. 4 (letter to editor defending Virginia Law Review plan);
Raspberry, Affirmative Action that Hurts Blacks, Wash. Post, Feb. 23, 1987, at A 11, col. 4 (op-
ed attacking Virginia affirmative action plan); N.Y. Times, Mar. 22, 1981, at A 18, col. 3 (letter
to editor supporting Harvard Law Review affirmative action plan: "Rather than bemoan the
loss of tradition, we should re-examine the basis for analyzing law school graduates seeking
employment to allow for fairer evaluation and utilization of skilled lawyers."); N.Y. Times,
Mar. 9, 1981, at A22, col. 3 (letter to editor on Harvard plan: "should be applauded as a step
toward breaking down the sexual and racial barriers that exist in our legal system today");
Drawing Distinctions at Harvard Law Review, N.Y. Times, Mar. 3, 1981, at A18, col. I (edito-
rial critical of Harvard plan); Harvard Law Review's Ethnic Screening Criticized, N.Y. Times,
Feb. 24, 1981, at A12, col. 2.
101. See Fidler, supra note 9, at 53 (46% use grades; only 2% rely exclusively on grades).
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system has come under harsh attack as inaccurate and imprecise, at best,
and arbitrary, at worst. 102
There is, however, a sense in which law school grades are both pre-
cise and accurate. They are precise inasmuch as particular students tend
to "earn" consistent grades with a reasonably narrow range; they appar-
ently measure something fairly well. That something is the student's ca-
pacity to psychoanalyze professors, to write quickly, and to analyze
superficially various aspects of a complex legal problem; in measuring
those skills law exams are remarkably accurate. 103
Paradoxically, these attributes that the GPA measures with preci-
sion and accuracy have little to do with the effective research skills, inci-
sive legal reasoning, persuasive advocacy, and originality that the ideal
law review selection process is supposed to detect. Quite to the contrary,
except for the student who has not cracked his textbook all semester,
performance on a law exam does not call for original research. More-
over, certain attributes on which the law exam bases its selection are
downright incompatible with good writing. Students need never write a
decent English sentence on a law exam. Grammar counts for little in the
face of severe time constraints.
The professor who admonishes students that good writing is half the
battle on a law exam probably means that the answer should be organ-
ized and thorough, not that it should be well-written. Even superior or-
ganization and thoroughness in the answer's content do not necessarily
translate into law review skill; the capacity to spot and discuss issues
quickly and superficially is a far cry from the meticulousness and thor-
oughness that law review writing and editing demand.l°0 The converse is
also true: that a particular student cannot write an organized and thor-
ough analysis in an hour says nothing of her ability to do so in a year. In
short, the law school exam measures primarily cogency not of considered
reason, but of conditioned reflex.
I would not go so far as to maintain, as some do, that success on law
school exams is utterly unrelated to legal reasoning, originality, and even
some elements of legal writing, but to assume even a strong correlation
does not salvage the GPA-based selection process. To the extent that
grades detect differences in levels of skill, "[t]he differences between stu-
102. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
103. Cf Motley, supra note 24, at 736-43 (law exam measures "undesirable skills").
104. In fact, the meticulousness that the law review demands-bordering on anal reten-
tiveness-is, for better or for worse, weeded out by law school exams. The student who dots
every "i" and crosses every "t" is more likely to run out of time to spot the extra issue or make
the extra "policy" argument that amounts to an "A" answer.
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dents could be 'leveled' up at minimal cost."' 10 5 If the law school "sys-
tematically accentuates differences in real capacities,"' 1 6 the law review,
assuming it is truly a worthwhile experience, further exaggerates them.
B. The Writing Competition
Most law reviews select at least part of their membership on the
basis of a writing competition. 0 7 In theory, such a competition assesses
a student's research, analysis, and writing skills.108 The writing competi-
tion, as typically administered and judged, however, has little to do with
assessing any of those skills. It has much more to do with formalistic
conformity.
(1) What Writing Competitions Do Not Measure Well
Writing competitions cannot even pretend to measure research
skills. The competition is invariably "canned" (i.e., preresearched) and
the rules almost always prohibit reference to outside authority under
penalty of disqualification.
The typical writing competition is also an inapt measure of analyti-
cal skills for at least two reasons. First, the contestant is generally sub-
ject to a strict code of "ethics" that prohibits discussion of the topic with
others. This prohibition deprives the contestant of the academic's most
valuable idea-testing tool-collegial collaboration. More importantly,
the exemplar is short, typically seven to ten pages. A student is unable to
engage in much analysis in that space, given the law review formalities
that bind her. 10 9 Of a ten-page sample, the substance of seven or eight
pages is likely to be identical from one sample to the next. That leaves
two or three pages in which to dazzle the judges with brilliance or baffle
them with bullshit.
Such short and formalistic exemplars, based on canned research and
deprived of the benefit of collaborative idea-testing, could concededly
measure some real differences in the authors' writing styles, originality,
and analytical powers, but the judges are probably not measuring those
qualities. Not that they do not purport to judge them-the litany of cri-
teria assigned discrete point values generally includes those categories
105. Kennedy, Hierarchy, supra note 1, at 31.
106. Id.
107. See Fidler, supra note 9, at 53.
108. But cf Schlegel, supra note 10, at 19 n.2 (suggesting that random selection is better).
109. Cf Rodell, Goodbye to Law Reviews-Revisited, 48 VA. L. REV. 279. 282 (1962)
[hereinafter Rodell, Revisited]. ("IT]he strait-jacket of law review style has killed what might




and others-but the judges are students, with only one more year of law
school training than the competitors.' 0 The primary difference between
the judge and the contestant is that the former, after one year on law
review, has learned to bluebook better and faster than the latter. The
judges' inexperience with the medium undermines their ability to evalu-
ate analysis, originality, and writing style. While I limit the following
illustration to originality, similar observations might just as readily be
made of analysis and writing style.
As judged in the writing competition, originality is likely to take on
a stiffingly narrow meaning. So far as law students, and perhaps most
professors, are aware, legal writing is governed by rigid rules, deviation
from which is not original, but simply wrong. The students are likely to
judge legal reasoning by the formalistic standards with which they have
grown most comfortable: case-by-case analysis, nice distinctions, tenu-
ous analogies, and blind adoption of the assumptions on which doctrine
is based.
More often than not, the topic cries out for an abandonment of such
doctrinal formalism. A smattering of one law school's most recent com-
petition topics, for example, includes a right-to-die case involving re-
moval from a severely demented patient of the nasogastric tube that
nourished her;"' an equal protection case in which an applicant was de-
nied a firearm license because he had once committed himself to a mental
hospital for a week;" 12 and a prisoner's due process challenge to denial of
work release, allegedly because of public opposition rather than statutory
ineligibility. 113
110. See Kester, supra note 37, at 10 ("the process is left... in the hands of young people
with little experience in evaluating legal skills, few standards by which to do so, natural na-
ivete, and scant regard for the institutional future").
111. In re Conroy, 190 N.J. Super. 453, 464 A.2d 303 (App. Div. 1983), rev'd, 98 N.J. 321,
486 A.2d 1209 (1984).
112. Galioto v. Department of Treasury, 602 F. Supp. 682 (D.N.J. 1985), vacated and
remanded, 106 S. Ct. 2683 (1986).
113. Winsett v. McGuinness, 617 F.2d 996 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1093
(1981). Other cases included: Clark v. Library of Congress, 750 F.2d 89 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(first amendment claim against Library of Congress by employee who allegedly was denied
promotion because of affiliation with socialist group); Grace v. Burger, 665 F.2d 1193 (D.C.
Cir. 1981) (first amendment challenge against Supreme Court police who threatened protesters
with arrest for distributing political materials and carrying sign with words of first amend-
ment), aff'd in part and vacated in part, 461 U.S. 171 (1983); Koski v. Samaha, 648 F.2d 790
(Ist Cir. 1981) (prosecutor allegedly threatened defendant with more severe sentence if she
exercised right to appeal trial court's decision); Virgin Islands v. Scotland, 614 F.2d 360 (3d
Cir. 1980) (suit by convict for specific performance on plea offer which he accepted before
prosecutor imposed additional condition that he swear to truth of earlier statement implicating
codefendant).
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To take the first example, the truly original contestant might ignore
the nice legal distinctions between heroic and nonheroic life sustenance
or active and passive euthanasia, and instead construct a brilliant moral
argument that it is always wrong to deprive a living human being of
nourishment. She might in the third example ignore the statutory lan-
guage and espouse an insightful political position that corrections boards
should have the discretion to consider public opinion. Either entry
might win the ten-point originality allocation, but will most assuredly
lose more in the substance category. The contestant's version of original-
ity would not conform to the rules, as the judge has been taught to un-
derstand them.
The student judges may not truly measure originality, even in the
restrictive sense of the word, if they fail to account for two differences
between the contestants and themselves. First, the judge, unlike the indi-
vidual contestant, knows what other contestants have said. After reading
twenty identical pieces, the judge cannot help but be attracted to the one
that is dissimilar from the others. Dissimilarity, however, is too easily
mistaken for originality. That nineteen hermetically sealed students all
come up with the same idea does not negate the idea's originality; nor is
there is much reason to suppose that the twentieth who comes up with a
different idea is any more original. Second, the student judge starts out
with a more expansive body of general legal knowledge than the contest-
ant. An approach that the judge has encountered in class or the legal
literature may nevertheless be original from the perspective of a contest-
ant who is new to the entire field.
The knowledge disparity is particularly problematic when, as is usu-
ally the case, the editors choose a "leveling" topic, one chosen from the
upper class curriculum on which no first-year class has focused. The
theory is that no first-year section should have an unfair edge over others
because its professor covered a relevant substantive issue in particular
detail."I4 Whatever the merits or demerits of a leveling topic," 5 it cer-
tainly tends to widen the knowledge disparity between the contestant and
the judge.
It is unfair to impute the two possible misapprehensions of "origi-
nality" entirely or exclusively to the judges' inexperience. An exper-
114. The writing competition's format-typically a law review note or case comment-is
chosen with the same leveling purpose in mind. Precisely because no student has ever written
one, it is the preferred form.
115. Alternatives might include choosing a substantive area with which everyone is
equally familiar; choosing an unfamiliar substantive area and then educating everyone to the
same level of competence in that area; or allowing each student to select a topic.
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ienced judge, having seen writing samples for several years, might well be
even more struck than a novice by a dissimilar writing sample, and the
knowledge disparity between a law professor and a first-year student will
certainly be greater than that which divides a first- and second-year stu-
dent. I strongly suspect, however, that an experienced judge--one, for
example, who has taught first-year students and graded their law exams
for several years-will be more attuned to the differences between them-
selves and the contestants and will be more likely to avoid the pitfalls
that could lead to a false measure of originality.
(2) What Writing Competitions Measure
I have enumerated many qualities that the writing competition, as
administered and judged, does not measure well. Yet judges often agree
that a particular entry is better than others, and several law reviews
within the same school might invite the same contestant on the basis of
the same or different entries. As was true of grades, it cannot be denied
that the writing competition measures something accurately.
That something is formalistic conformity. The article must have the
correct structure: facts first, then background, then discussion (which
usually boils down to: "the case was right, but for the wrong reason" or
"both positions are too extreme, and we ought to strike a balance"), and
a short conclusion. It must evince just the right dosage of cititis and the
standard footnote-to-text ratio. And heaven forfend the student should
come up with a citation form that communicates a source better than
does the bluebook's prescription.
The slightest deviations from any of the specifications, despite the
discrete point allocations to form and bluebooking, will lower the entry's
credibility in the judge's eyes. The end result is a triumph of form over
substance, rewarding the contestant more for staying inside the lines and
painting by number than for brilliance, insight, and artistry.
That conclusion leads to two troubling implications. First, to the
extent that the writing competition measures real differences in skill it is
subject to the same criticism as the GPA-based selection: those skills are
readily taught and the differences easily shorn up. Second, the writing
competition, as administered and judged, is no more legitimate a crite-
rion for law review selection than is the GPA.
C. The Publishable Note
The submission of a publishable note, "publishing-on," is a third
method of member selection, and the one that most closely approximates
the ideal. The long-term project can provide a basis on which to assess
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research skills, analytical ability, style, and originality. Unlike the typi-
cal writing competition and the law exam, a publishable student note is
exhaustively researched and meticulously documented, providing a relia-
ble indication of the student's research skills.
The student's analytical abilities are also better measured by a long-
term project than by a three-hour exam or a week-long writing competi-
tion. The long-term project is not subject to the writing competition's
collaborative and length constraints. Contestants are free to discuss and
test ideas with any colleague or professor. In fact, the submissions are
often seminar papers that professors have already edited. To be sure, the
contestant must still adhere closely to the law review formula, but be-
cause the contestant's submission can exceed ten pages, he can fit a good
deal more substance into the note project than he could into the writing
competition.
Finally, although the judges of the long-term works are still stu-
dents, they are more likely to focus on the substance of an entry than are
the students who judge writing competitions. The student judges still
undoubtedly adhere to the narrow conception of originality, style, and
analysis, but the impact of that narrowness is likely to be less exaggerated
in this more realistic context.
To take originality as an example again, because the author chooses
the topic, the judge's evaluation will not be skewed by what innumerable
other contestants have said. Moreover, because the author of a student
note researches the topic extensively, her knowledge of the topic is likely
to be broader than the judge's knowledge. Accordingly, the contestant is
more likely to devise an approach that is truly original in the relevant
sense; and because the judge is less likely to have seen it before, he is less
likely to conclude that a contestant's independently formulated approach
is unoriginal.
Paradoxically, while almost every law review allows students to
publish-on, it is the least utilized road toward law review membership.
Less than one-eighth of all law reviews in a recent survey chose their
membership exclusively by publishable note.116 Although the reported
data do not reveal what percentage of students publish-on when other
means are available, my own unscientific sampling of law review manuals
suggests that the proportion is negligible. Thus, the publish-on proce-
dure does little to undermine the truth of the secret with which this sec-
tion began: The credential of most law review members is false because
116. Only 23% relied exclusively on an assessment of writing skills, and of them 23%
selected membership exclusively on the submission of a publishable note. Fidler, supra note 9,
at 53.
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the process by which they are selected is false. Ironically, as a later dis-
cussion will demonstrate, publish-ons have to be largely excluded from
law reviews that select members by other means because that acceptance
of publish-ons threatens to divulge the first secret. 117
IV. The Second Deep, Dark Secret: Law Review
as an Illusory Experience
The discussion of the law review credential so far has assumed that a
competition that does not accurately identify the best researchers, the
sharpest intellects, the most persuasive advocates, or the most creative
writers is ill-suited to the selection of law review members. There is,
however, an ironic sense in which the falsity of the selection process does
not matter. The job for which the competitors are vying depends little on
such talents. Law review does not make you any smarter-the experi-
ence is illusory." 8 That is the second deep, dark secret.
The secret is well-guarded. Historically, a myth has emerged that
law review experience is extraordinarily worthwhile. That myth has been
so pervasive that the experience has often been offered as the law review's
primary raison d'etre, 1 9 prompting one author to propose that The Law
Review Should Become the Law School. 120 As Dean Havighurst put it in
1956: "Whereas most periodicals are published primarily in order that
they may be read, the law reviews are published primarily in order that
they may be written."'' Even the law review's critics have accepted the
myth uncritically. 122
The law review members have all heard the hype. But the vast ma-
jority know it to be exaggerated. Unlike the first secret, then, most mem-
bers are fully aware of the second. If they are very perceptive, they
117. See infra notes 159-65 and accompanying text (discussing how publish-ons threaten
both secrets).
118. One commentator explains: "[L]aw review members in many cases experience two
years of intellectual isolation, sharply decreased class attendance and much time spent engag-
ing in two key law review activities-editing one another's papers and socializing." N.Y.
Times, Mar. 22, 1981, at 18, col. 3 (letter to editor).
119. See Lee, Administration of the Law Review, 9 J. LEGAL EDUC. 223, 224 (1956) ("The
first goal of any law review must be to teach."); Rotunda, supra note 38, at 4 (training alone
justifies law review's existence); Warren, supra note 46, at 1 ("Most important, the review
affords invaluable training to the students.").
120. Westwood, The Law Review Should Become the Law School 31 VA. L. REV. 913
(1945).
121. Havighurst, Law Reviews and Legal Education, 51 Nw. L. REV. 22, 24 (1956).
122. See, e.g., Cramton, American Law Review, supra note 8, at 5, 8-9 ("it remains un-
questioned that law-review work is a valuable educational experience for most students who
participate in it," but the concentration of members' efforts on selection of new members de-
tracts from experience).
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might infer it from the law review invitation letter. They will, in any
event, be sure of it by the end of their first year on law review. Neverthe-
less, practically every member continues to do the required work and
guard the secret, spurred perhaps by a desire to retain the credential and
by a perception that they are qualified to do no more.
A. The Long-Awaited Letter: Invitation or Draft?
Law review membership begins with a letter of "invitation" that is
vaguely reminiscent of the bid of the exclusive college fraternity. 1
23
While some invitations presume the student's acceptance,124 most ask the
initiate to RSVP.1 25 It matters little, for, like its fraternity counterpart,
the invitation is virtually never turned down.
The substance of the invitation is as telling as its form. Unsurpris-
ingly, it incorporates suggestions of both experience and credential. First
comes the credential. If ever the student doubted the legitimacy of the
law review selection criteria, the letter makes it official. The edi-
123. As was true of the law school bulletins, see supra note 82, I do not pretend to have
scientifically surveyed all law reviews. I merely requested invitation letters and manuals from
30 law reviews of all levels of prestige. The themes that I extract here are almost uniform.
Because the object here is merely to identify those general themes and not to embarass any
particular law review, the citations to internal law review documents and correspondence are
coded. Redacted copies are on file at The Hastings Law Journal.
For an insightful discussion of the dynamic and motivation of the college fraternity, see
The Greek Rites of Exclusion, Nation, July 4, 1987, at 10.
124. Letter from Law Review A Managing Editor to author (Feb. 28, 1986) ("The new
members are posted upon completion of the grading; it is assumed that anyone enduring the
pain of the [writing] competition will be willing to join."); Letter from Law Review B Edi-
tor-in-Chief to Invitees (Aug. 22, 1985) [hereinafter Invitation B] ("Feel free to stop by and
introduce yourself at any time. We look forward to meeting and working with you."); Letter
from Law Review C Editor-in-Chief to Invitees (undated) [hereinafter Invitation C] (conclud-
ing invitation with, "I will contact you early next month regarding an orientation meeting.
Until then, you should consider a topic for your article."); Letter from Law Review D Edi-
tor-in-Chief to Invitees (Feb. 19, 1986) [hereinafter Invitation D] (concluding with, "Again,
congratulations on your scholastic achievement and welcome to the Law Review D."); Letter
from Law Review E Editor-in-Chief to Invitees (Mar. 4, 1986) [hereinafter Invitation E] (con-
cluding invitation with, "We are proud to have you join our efforts.").
125. See, e.g., Letter from Law Journal F Editor-in-Chief to Invitees (July 18, 1984) (re-
questing telephone acceptance within 12 days); Letter from Law Review G Editor-in-Chief to
Invitees (July 10, 1985) [hereinafter Invitation G] (requesting acceptance by letter within nine
days); Letter from Law Review H Editor-in-Chief to Invitees (Aug. 8, 1985) [hereinafter Invi-
tation H] (requesting telephone acceptance within seven days).
The more exclusive specialized law reviews offer the same invitation. See, e.g., Letter
from Law Review I Editor in Chief to Invitees (July 29, 1984) (tax); Letter from Law Review J
Editor-in-Chief to Invitees (July 15, 1984) (criminal law); Letter from Law Review K Edi-
tor-in-Chief to Invitees (July 23, 1984) (international business). In those cases, however, the
invitation might not be quite as illusory because, unlike the "main" law review, they often have
to compete with others in the same school.
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tor-in-chief invariably opens and closes the letter by congratulating the
initiate for "outstanding academic performance," a predictable and mar-
ginally reassuring vote of confidence from the most conspicuous symbol
of law review credential.1 26 Beyond the congratulatory salutation and
closing, the credential theme is barely mentioned. It need not be; the first
secret is so well-kept that no one questions the credential. Instead, the
bulk of the invitation is devoted to a sales pitch that emphasizes the expe-
rience: members refine legal skills while furthering legal scholarship.
1 27
Given the virtual inevitability of the member's acceptance, both the
invitation format and the sales pitch are puzzling. Whether or not they
are so planned, both serve useful functions. The invitation format rein-
forces the voluntary nature of the servitude to follow. No matter how
powerful the external pressures that compel acceptance of the invitation,
the member can believe that she was not drafted into the drudgery of law
review; she volunteered.12 8 As the work grows increasingly burdensome
and mundane, the member can take consolation in the apparent freedom
of the choice she made.
If its only purposes were to reiterate the credential and solicit the
member to volunteer, one might almost expect the invitation to be short
and sweet: "You may already be a winner. Claim your prize at any par-
ticipating law review." But the invitation serves as more than a claim
check for the prize. It is the first warning that the law review experience
might not be what the student had anticipated. I would be willing to bet
that half of the law review membership does not appreciate the nature of
law review work, or that it entails any work, until they are selected. That
is partially because of the emphasis on the credential for the entire pre-
ceding year. For some students, then, the invitation is the first sugges-
tion that law review membership demands commitment and hard work
("40 hours per term on operations work, and perhaps 150 to 200 hours
126. See, eg., Invitation B, supra note 124 ("Congratulations and welcome to the ranks of
Law Review!"); Invitation C, supra note 124 ("I am pleased to congratulate you on your ex-
ceptional academic achievement").
127. See Invitation D, supra note 124 (law review "will prove to be a valuable phase of
your legal education. . . [Y]ou will have the opportunity to expand and sharpen your
skills."); Invitation G, supra note 125 ("opportunity to develop and refine your research and
writing skills"; description of topics that "will be of special interest to the legal community");
Invitation B, supra note 124 ("excellent reputation as a scholarly publication"; "The discipline
and training you will derive from membership on the Law Review is unparalleled."); Invita-
tion E, supra note 124 ("excellent opportunity to develop analytical research and writing
skills"; "the last or final word on the law is a privilege entrusted to the law review editors of
our law schools").
128. Cf Dalton, Book Review, 6 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 229, 238 (1983) (criticizing rheto-
ric of consent in liberal theory).
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working on your piece"), 29 and that parts of the experience are not par-
ticularly rewarding ("not all Review work requires the mental acumen of
a Supreme Court Justice"). 130 Hence the sales pitch. It cushions the
blow, reassuring the student that however tedious and irrelevant the next
year's work on law review may seem, it will be good for him.
B. Hell Year
Despite the myth and the invitation's assurances that law review is a
valuable scholastic and creative experience, with the first law review as-
signment, the member begins to harbor doubts: Was the sales pitch a
sham? Was the selection process no more than a contest to determine
who will get to clean the law review's floors? If the invitation is like a
fraternity bid, law review work, for most, is akin to "hell week," the
week-long period of torture and humiliation that pledges must endure to
prove their worthiness to keep the fraternity's deep, dark secrets. There
are only two differences. First, the law review member's hell lasts a full
year. Second, hell week, appropriately or not, is merely the rite of pas-
sage to the fraternity's putative benefits; once the initiate enters, hell
week ends. In contrast, law reviews attempt, somewhat successfully, to
convince their initiates that the benefit they offer is their hell year.
By the end of the first year on law review, the member should have
learned the law review's second deep, dark secret. This section examines
the experience and offers speculations as to why, in the face of hell year,
the member never divulges the second secret.
(1) "Thank you, Sir. May I have another?". Law Review as an Experience
The most notorious symbol of hell week is the fraternity pledge pad-
dle; each initiate painstakingly carves one and engraves on it the mystical
fraternity letters. On the eve of initiation, the initiate bends over to be
paddled with the product of his own labor, the symbol of fraternal unity.
With each resounding smack, the initiate must repeat the words, "Thank
you, Sir. May I have another?"
The law review's paddle, engraved with the words, "A Uniform Sys-
tem of Citation," is the bluebook. The law review initiate is smacked
with assignment after tedious assignment. The submission of (and to)
129. Invitation H, supra note 125 ("Please consider whether you can realistically make a
major commitment to the Review."); see Letter from Law Review L Editor-in-Chief to Invitees
(undated) ("two credits in exchange for your work on the Review"); Invitation G, supra note
125 ("Although the work can be demanding at times, we believe your experience on the Law
Review will be both worthwhile and rewarding.").
130. Invitation H, supra note 125.
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each assignment is an implicit request for the next. Members are rarely
expected to apply a whit of the superior intellect and creativity that
membership ostensibly recognizes. Instead, law review work consists
primarily of "production work" and an often bogus writing program.
131
Little need be said about production work. A typical explanation of
bluebooking is as follows:
Bluebookers are required to read all the cases, law reviews, treatises,
statutes, and other materials cited to make sure they support the au-
thor's thesis and argument, and check every footnote to make sure that
they conform to the stylistic rules laid down in the [law review's] Edi-
tors Guide and the Bluebook.'
32
The task emphasizes form over substance. 133 While there may be
some practical value in learning to bluebook, it is not so great as to justify
a year of practice. Typing the articles, on the other hand, is entirely
devoid of academic value, as are office hours, proofreading, and envelope
stuffing. I do not presume to judge the worthiness of these occupations;
they might well be nobler and more productive than the publication of
legal drivel. The point is simply that most law review work has little to
do with the experience that the law review promises-to make better
lawyers or legal scholars.
The writing program is seemingly better suited to the task. Billed as
"the most significant responsibility of staff membership," the writing pro-
gram "is important to the [law review] because as an institution its mem-
bers are expected to possess high-quality writing and research skills and
as a publication its reputation depends largely on the quality and quan-
tity of its student writing."' 34 As described, the staff member is under
intense editorial supervision. The board sets strict timetables for topic
selection, research, outlining, first draft, and so on.135 All the while, the
editor sharpens the member's analysis and refines her writing. The inevi-
table end product, it would seem, is a publishable note.
That description borders on fantasy. In the first place, one can
131. See Fidler, supra note 9, at 55-57 (surveying law review staff responsibilities).
132. LAW JOURNAL F, STAFF MANUAL AND CONSTITUTION 14 (1984) [hereinafter F
MANUAL].
133. See infra note 193 (quoting Judge Posner's description of bluebook as triumph of
form over substance).
134. MANUAL F, supra note 133, at 11; see also LAW REVIEW A, MEMBERS' MANUAL 14
(1985-86) ("The reputation of the Review depends to a great extent on the quality of its stu-
dent writing."); LAW REVIEW G, LAW REVIEW HANDBOOK 1.10 (1985) (one paragraph in-
troducing writing program includes: "opportunity for the author to develop writing and
research skills"; "service to the legal community"; "process is designed to insure that student
works meet these criteria and will reflect favorably on the reputation of" law review).
135. See, e.g., LAW REVIEW L, OPERATIONS MANUAL 19-23 (1984) [hereinafter MAN-
UAL L] (extensive month-by-month timetable for writing of note).
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hardly expect law review editors to impart to members much in the way
of writing skill if the law school never teaches the editors to write well. 
136
That there is not much skillful writing going on in the law review office is
hardly a revelation. The late Fred Rodell said Goodbye to Law Reviews
in 1936 and again in 1962.137 Three sentences sum up his conclusion:
"There are two things wrong with almost all legal writing. One is style.
The other is content." 138  Others have repeated those sentiments with
increasing frequency. 139 It suffices to say that the writing that law review
members are trained to produce is, for the most part, uninspired, insig-
nificant, and stilted.
It is perhaps unfair to condemn the law review for teaching what
has come to be law review writing. It is, after all, the language of legal
scholars. A more serious criticism is that, as administered, the law re-
view writing program does not teach even that. More often than not, the
members know they can get by with the barest minimum. Timetables are
flexible. The editors, however well-intentioned, have little leverage with
which to force members to write. There is always the threat that "[a]ny
staff member who fails to fulfill the [writing] requirements ... shall auto-
matically be referred to disciplinary proceedings." 140 Yet, only those
who fail to do production work are ordinarily punished. Rarely is a
member ousted or otherwise punished for turning in a low quality prod-
uct, or no product at all, to satisfy the writing requirement. It is no
wonder that the vast majority of law review members' notes are never
published, 14 1 and that the law review needs to turn to the nonmember
author for material.
Even when the member writes, the project's connection to the law
review is often tenuous. Either work submitted for a required writing
course satisfies the law review's writing program, or law review work
satisfies the school's writing requirement. 142 In the former case, a student
136. See Kissam, Thinking (By Writing) About Legal Writing, 40 VAND. L. REV. 135, 141-
51 (1987) (law school fails to teach "critical" dimension, or the process, of writing).
137. Rodell, Goodbye to Law Reviews, 23 VA. L. REV. 38 (1936); Rodell, Revisited, supra
note 109.
138. Rodell, Revisited, supra note 109, at 279.
139. See, e.g., Boyle, supra note 6, at 18; Cramton, American Law Review, supra note 8, at
7-10; Nowak, Woe Unto You, Law Reviews!, 27 ARIz. L. REV. 317, 321-24 (1985).
140. MANUAL F, supra note 132, app. B, at 9.
141. Over half of the law reviews in Fidler's survey were able to publish less than one out
of three notes submitted by their own members, and a full 82% published less than half.
Fidler, supra note 9, at 56. Despite the increase in the size of law review staffs, their generation
of student work has declined over the years. Roger Cramton reports that three prestigious law
reviews in the period 1980-1983 published 0.4 notes per second-year member, compared to 1.9
in 1955-1958. Cramton, American Law Review, supra note 8, at 6 n.24.
142. 75% of law schools surveyed awarded academic credit for membership, and law re-
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might submit a seminar paper, which is also required of the rest of the
student body, in full satisfaction of her law review writing requirement.
Moreover, strict honor codes often prohibit submission of such a paper
to a law review editor until after grading by the professor. In the latter
case, the law review member is simply doing what everyone else in the
school is doing, only he calls it a law review submission and everyone else
calls it a seminar paper. In either case, law review members get no more
writing experience by virtue of their membership than do their nonmem-
ber counterparts.
Despite the failure of the law review program to fulfill its promise as
a unique scholastic experience, some members truly believe it to be
worthwhile. Perhaps their perception is clouded by the law review cre-
dential. If enough people-employers included-maintain that law re-
view is a valuable experience, it becomes difficult to deny. 143 It may also
be that some members recognize law review work as the mindless tedium
that it is, but are nevertheless taken with its importance. The law review
itself cultivates both myths. As to the importance of their role, the mem-
ber is told that each task will bear on the reputation of the law review,
the law school, the editorial board, and the member herself.144 She is an
integral part of a well-oiled machine.1 45 As to the value of the experi-
ence, the law review explains that the job is for the member's own good.
The intricate process
provide[s] you with an opportunity to improve your ability to analyze
legal issues, to do legal research, and to write clearly and precisely. In
view membership suffices in the overwhelming majority of schools that have a writing require-
ment. See Fidler, supra note 9, at 62.
143. Even prominent scholars assume that law firm wooing of law review members is an
indication of the quality of the law review experience. One commentator, for example, re-
peated the equation twice in one breath: "[T]he [law review] training has been remarkably
successful. Law firms woo those with law review experience. Even in the era where law review
selection is often not only the product of class rank, law firms still lavish special attention on
those with law review experience." Rotunda, supra note 38, at 5.
144. See, eg., MANUAL L, supra note 135, at 29:
To earn this reputation [as a high quality legal periodical] and keep it, what we
publish must be not only current and insightful, it must also be well written and
accurate. Later researchers.., must be confident that the source will say what the
Review says it does....
A citation not in Bluebook form may seem a trivial error but... [i]f the Review
doesn't perform such a simple task, a reader may properly wonder how many other,
more major errors we ignore.
See also MANUAL F, supra note 132, at 16 ("precise bluebooking, although admittedly tedious,
is a mark of professionalism").
145. MANUAL F, supra note 132, at 5 ("Each step in the process for each article is crucial
to getting the issue out on time-a delay by one bluebooker can hold up an entire issue even
though dozens of other Editors and Staff members met all their deadlines.").
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these areas, the [law review] provides an educational experience supe-
rior to virtually any other available at [the law school]. We hope that
you will not only learn from it but enjoy it as well. 146
For whatever reason, the members almost invariably answer,
"Thank you, Sir. May I have another?"
(2) Keeping the Pledge: Why the Member Remains and Maintains Silence
While I have acknowledged that some law review members may ac-
tually believe the experience is benefitting them, most probably do not.
One must wonder why students who thought they were to be rewarded
for superior talent are willing to endure such torture, and endure it with-
out divulging the law review's secrets. Just as in the first year of law
school, the members repeatedly ask, "Why am I taking this shit from
them?"'147 Two explanations suggest themselves, each mirroring the
most fundamental criticisms of the law school generally. First, the value
of the law review credential becomes more concrete. Second, for a full
year, the law review novice learns that he is incompetent to do any more
than the work he is assigned.
a. Credential Solidification
Over the summer vacation between the first and second years of law
school, the law review, once a milestone towards which to strive, be-
comes a yardstick against which to measure success. It superimposes
over the student body a rigid hierarchy. Some make it, most do not.
Even among the law reviews, there is a hierarchy. As section V will dis-
cuss in greater detail, since members on each of the law reviews perform
essentially the same tasks, the differences in prestige are attributable en-
tirely to the credential that each signifies. After a year's worth of legiti-
mation, the student body internalizes that hierarchy, its falsity
notwithstanding. Just like the grades on which membership is often
based, members and nonmembers alike perceive their place in the law
review hierarchy as "something that is just 'there' inside them."'' 48
There is more, however, to the power of the law review credential
than mere internalization of an abstract ranking. The hierarchy is rein-
forced by the same concrete rewards that seemed to legitimate the cre-
dential during the first year. 149 On entering the school, members stop
146. Id. at 2.
147. Kennedy, Polemic, supra note 15, at 76 (emphasis in original); see supra note 17.
148. Kennedy, Hierarchy, supra note 1, at 51; see supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text
(discussing internalization of grades).
149. See supra text following note 99 (describing concrete rewards that legitimate law re-
view credential).
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into their offices, hang up their coats and leave their books, while the rest
of the students must be content to cram theirs into undersized lockers.
The members emerge from their offices with mugs of free coffee while the
rest of the school must be content to stand in cafeteria lines filling
styrofoam cups and paying the price. At night, when the rest of the stu-
dents are herded out the library door, members can stay, asserting their
dubious after-hours privileges. 150
Members are also the victors in the competition for their professors'
time and the administration's attention. Whether it is because the law
review member has enhanced credibility, or because the faculty and ad-
ministration have vested interests in the perceived quality of their
school's law review, the disparity in attention afforded the law school's
"intellectual elite" and the rest of the student body is glaring.
Finally, there are the ego boosters, the accoutrements of member-
ship that serve no purpose other than to appeal to the member's craving
for self-importance: Consider for example the masthead, publicizing
every member by name and rank. This gives the member much-needed
recognition in an otherwise anonymous law school setting, but is other-
wise practically nonfunctional.
The perks and status alone make it difficult to denounce law review
work. The law review member would have trouble justifying her claim
to them after admitting that anyone could do the work; conversely, to
denounce the work is to renounce one's claim to the perks.
Denunciation becomes all the more unlikely once interview season
raises the stakes.151 Students' careers turn on the fortuity of law review
membership. It is perhaps neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition
to the choice positions among clerkships, law firms, public-interest
groups, or government jobs, but it certainly opens doors, and it rarely
hurts. All employers, or at least all those who interview on campus, as-
sume the law review to be valuable. Some will not even consider students
without the law review credential, purporting to value the experience it
engenders.1 52 Moreover, the value of the credential is tied to the law
150. See, e.g., MANUAL F, supra nete 132, at 21-23 (listing as perks: after hours library
access; photocopying facilities; access to MCI long distance telephone service; message service;
bulletin board advertising space; coat hooks; and cabinet space for books).
151. See Rodell, Revisited, supra note 109, at 285:
The students who write for law reviews are egged on by the comforting thought
that they will be pretty sure to get jobs when they graduate in return for the slavery,
and the super-students who do the editorial or dirty work are egged on even harder
by the knowledge that they will get even bigger jobs.
152. See N.Y. Times, Mar. 22, 1981, at A18, col. 3 ("Law firms and corporate law depart-
ments in every major city screen job applicants on the basis of first-year law school grades and
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review's status within the inter-law review hierarchy.
Whatever the reason, law review members get the earliest and the
most prestigious offers. To denounce the law review at this point impli-
cates not just perks but the member's future. Renunciation of the creden-
tial, however illegitimate it may be, narrows career options. The member
does the work, because he wants to keep the short-term credential, which
can translate into a long-term, if equally false, credential.
If long-term status were the sole motive force preventing members
from denouncing the law review and divulging its secrets, one might ex-
pect many more members to abandon the law review after the first inter-
view season. That so few do is attributable, at least in part, to the fact
that they have not yet depleted the law review's credential value. Mem-
bers, especially those whose grades are lower or who may not return to
their summer firm, might still be concerned about the law review creden-
tial for permanent employment. Others may begin to think about the
judicial clerkship process, which begins soon after the law firm interview
season ends. Prestigious judges tend to require law review experience.
If the explanation posited so far is true, one might expect a mass
exodus from law review by its third-year members who presumably no
longer need the credential. In fact, however, the rate of attrition among
third year law review members is also low. There are two related expla-
nations for this. First, by the third year there is no reason to reject the
credential and divulge the second secret; the paddling has stopped, per-
haps because the paddlers know they must stop. After all, third years are
utterly unwilling to do any more than a modicum of work to retain their
credential. Second, once the paddling has stopped, it is in every mem-
ber's best interest to keep the secret. Having paid the price for the cre-
dential, it would be self-destructive to devalue it.
b. Perceived Incompetence
A second possible explanation for the member's willingness to sub-
mit to the law review torture is best introduced with an anecdote. A
particularly feisty staff member felt understandably oppressed by the size
of the "production packet" that he was typing. Between hunts and pecks
on the keyboard, he threw up his hands in frustration and declared,
"They could have gotten a monkey to do this." Just then, the edi-
membership in law reviews avoiding year after year the burden of attempting to evaluate po-
tential employees on the basis of overall experience and ability."); see also infra notes 194-98
and accompanying text (discussing anomaly that law firms with greatest number of law review
alumni most value the credential).
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tor-in-chief, still a guru to the fledgling member, walked by and re-
torted, "We did."
While the law review credential is being reinforced, the member also
receives a somewhat conflicting message. Like the fraternity pledge, he is
no more than a peon, and just as the first-year law student has been con-
ditioned to internalize professorial abuse, the fledgling law review mem-
ber's response is to accept that position: "I deserve to take this shit. I am
wrong and stupid."
153
The law review's intricate institutional practices, often precisely de-
fined in the staff manual, reinforce the feeling of near worthlessness. The
staff is expected to carry out specific duties under threat of harsh penal-
ties. Several sanctions are threatened including a warning, more work,
adverse formal evaluations, cleaning out the refrigerator, and expulsion.
If and when the member realizes that the assigned tasks are not
nearly as rewarding as the invitation had promised, the higher-ups ex-
plain that she is just not ready for the rest. Underlying the myth of self-
importance, then, is a deeper and, as time goes on, much more pro-
nounced theme of incompetence. The second-year law student can be
trusted with only the most mundane of tasks, and even that work seems
to devolve into an exercise in institutionalized browbeating. Staff mem-
bers sit for hours with their respective editors and review each change,
word by word, comma by comma. In some law reviews the preparation
for that sitting entails photocopying every source that is checked. The
member bears the burden of proving that the author cited the wrong
page or left out a comma in quoting an authority. Sometimes, despite
these safeguards, the member has missed a space or a comma that the
editor's keen eye catches. He is duly chastised, and the incident is duly
memorialized in the member's "permanent 
file."
The member's response is a mixture of resentment and internaliza-
tion. As time goes on, the members feel themselves incompetent to do
anything but technical cite checking. The substantive corrections that
they do make, are often so tentative that it is not clear how important the
staffer believes a given change to be. The member becomes alienated
from her work product so that both the quality of her work product and
her sense of identification with it decline.
This same theme of incompetence is reflected more subtly in the
writing program. The dearth of originality in student notes should not
be surprising. The student is permitted to say practically nothing that
153. Kennedy, Polemic, supra note 15, at 26; see supra text accompanying note 17 (dis-
cussing similar reaction to professorial subjugation).
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has not been said before. He must prove that it was not his idea by
dropping a footnote citing the source that already said it. 154 When the
student does say something new, it is never in an article. It is belittled
under the heading "note" or "comment," as if it had been scribbled on a
grocery list and tacked to the refrigerator. Further, the student-the no-
body that she is-is reminded of the triviality of her own existence by
having her name appended, if at all, at the end of the note and her work
attributed to the board.155
(3) Credential vs. Incompetence
There is admittedly something odd about the foregoing discussion of
the motives for both remaining on law review and keeping its secrets.
The two proposed hypotheses seem to be in tension. The first hypothesis,
credential solidification, holds that the member will endure hell year to
preserve his status in the hierarchy and reap the benefits of the creden-
tial; the second, perceived incompetence, holds that the member will en-
dure the tedium because he is convinced that he is unqualified for
anything else. The first depends on the member's thirst for self-aggran-
dizement, and the second on his susceptibility to deprecation. The first,
if internalized, conduces a feeling of self-importance, and the second,
self-doubt.
The hypotheses are not entirely contradictory. The same person
could at the same time be driven by a credential yet doubt his capabili-
ties. Indeed, as insecurity mounts, the yearning for some outward sym-
bol of achievement is likely to grow stronger. Conversely, the more a
member internalizes the credential and the more he considers the law
154. In one particularly humorous illustration of the cititis syndrome, a bluebooker came
across the following tongue-in-cheek prediction about the impact of today's pollution on future
generations:
If Earth were to become one big warehouse for interplanetary use, humans
would care little whether the air is breathable or the water free of radioactive wastes.
If the Earth becomes a suitable place to store the galaxy's frozen foods, future gener-
ations might hail our foresight in inducing the greenhouse effect.
Rosenkranz, A Ghost of Christmas Yet to Come: Standing to Sue for Future Generations, I J.L.
& TECH. 71, 92 (1986) (footnote omitted). The bluebooker's sole comment was, "Cite?" See
also Boyle, supra note 6, at 18 (recounting story about facetious assertion that "male voice
rationality is characterised by an obsessive need for 'authority' ").
155. Rodell offered a more charitable explanation: "[Tiop dogs among the law review
authors ... are forced to confess authorship in public, whereas the small fry are spared the
embarrassment of signing their names." Rodell, Revisited, supra note 109, at 284. Whatever
the explanation, the law review editorial board takes credit for the opinions expressed in its
student notes. The implication is that the individual student is incapable of formulating and
expressing his own ideas. Further, if a student note is truly the voice of the editorial board,
then the student has diminished leeway to express novel or unpopular ideas.
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review socially valuable, the more frustrated he is likely to become by the
message of incompetence. Whichever of the two motive forces is
stronger, the results will be the same: adherence to the credential and
resentment of hell year.
V. Hierarchy and Self-Doubt
The previous section's discussion of perceived incompetence is not
the first place in this critique that the notion of self-doubt has arisen. It
arose first in the defense of the law review, where I speculated that law
review could overcome self-doubts caused by professorial oppression and
the dearth of feedback.' 56 So far, however, every subsequent mention of
self-doubt has contradicted that speculation. This section, which ex-
plores the self-doubt that arises out of various hierarchies in the law re-
view setting, adheres to that pattern. I consider first the hierarchy of
members in law reviews that have several methods of selecting members.
Next, I consider in turn two inter-law review hierarchies, the hierarchies
of (1) law reviews Within the school 157 and (2) law reviews from one
school to the next.
158
A. The Intra-Law Review Hierarchy
If the discussion of the first deep, dark secret (the falsity of the cre-
dential) does not convince the reader that the two most prevalent law
review selection methods are false, it at least suggests that certain
processes measure writing skills better than others.' 59 Among the three
criteria discussed, the publishable note is the best in that regard, then the
writing competition, and then the law exam. So well-guarded is the first
secret, however, that members of law reviews that administer more than
one selection process assign them the reverse ranking. A hierarchy of
members emerges that reflects that perceived ranking.
The hierarchy is not formal; all members, regardless of the manner
in which they are selected, list the same credential on their resumes. In
fact, few members will acknowledge the stratification explicitly, and
those who do are reproached with self-righteous indignation.160 The typ-
156. See supra text accompanying notes 17-27 (discussing sources of self-doubt in law
school).
157. See supra text preceding note 148 (noting intra-school hierarchy of law reviews).
158. I am indebted to Michael Small for many of the ideas developed on the inter-law
review hierarchies.
159. See supra text accompanying notes 101-03, 107-08.
160. A recent incident at one law review illustrates this point. A candidate for Edi-
tor-in-Chief in an apparent slip made a public statement to the effect that "we are all very
bright, except maybe for the handful of people who wrote on." What was most intriguing was
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ical characterization and administration of the various competitions,
however, strongly suggest an implicit stratification.
The first glimmer of such an intra-law review stratification comes,
once more, from the law school bulletin. Practically every bulletin that
describes a system of both grade-ons and write-ons (or publish-ons) ex-
plains that students are invited to join the law review either on the basis
of "academic success" or on the basis of a writing competition. The im-
plication is that GPA is the sole measure of academic success. It is not at
all clear what the writing competition is thought to measure.
One might easily dismiss that hint as a tenuous inference from loose
language. Concededly, such skepticism would be appropriate, were it
not for the frequency with which law reviews themselves reinforce the
hint. The invitations to law review often similarly equate grades with
academic success and the writing competition with some sort of aberra-
tional talent that grades might occasionally miss.1 61 The hint also fre-
quently pervades discussions of law review selection. One internal law
review memorandum, for example, observes "that many students who
for various reasons (health, pressure, psyche) do not excel in examina-
tions are nonetheless capable of making a significant contribution to the
[law review]."' 62 Again, the implicit assumption is that those who excel
on exams are necessarily valuable contributors; those who do not, but
can contribute anyway, are aberrational.
The administration of the various competitions also suggests the
substatus of write-ons and publish-ons. Many principal law reviews that
hold writing competitions identify the grade-ons first. Only then do the
write-ons enter the picture.163 Publish-ons do not show up until well into
the second year. The non-GPA selection processes appear to be
afterthoughts.
The students who publish-on are the most disdained of all. Referred
to in many law schools as a "non-Journal" or "non-Review" author, the
competitor who takes this route to law review is, by definition, an out-
not the slip itself-anyone could have done that- but the reactions of the grade-ons. The
school was buzzing the next day with reports of the terrible slip. Everyone seemed mortified.
The crime, it would seem, was not in believing that grade-ons were smarter than write-ons, but
having violated the cardinal rule never to shatter the outward appearance of harmony and
equality.
161. See infra note 126 (quoting law review invitation letters).
162. Memorandum from Joint Comm. on Affirmative Action to Executive Board 3 (un-
dated) (emphasis added) (law school affiliation withheld).
163. Georgetown is a typical example. While all writing competitions are evaluated before
grades are finalized, the student who qualifies on the basis of both grades and writing is told
only that she graded on.
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sider. That outsider status is not merely nominal; the nonmember author
is treated as an outsider. In the first place, the author's piece is typically
subjected to a standard so stringent that the percentage of nonmember
pieces that are accepted is negligible. 164 This is particularly anomalous
in those law reviews that will not even consider a nonmember's note un-
less a professor certifies it as publishable; such submissions tend to be the
best seminar papers that the professor has received from a class that has
studied and discussed the subject matter.
Furthermore, the nonmember's submission commands less editorial
attention than does a member's. Those that are rejected are rejected out-
right, without the benefit of the extensive editorial comments to which
the member is entitled. Thus, outsider participation is discouraged from
the outset. The combination of acrimony and stringency discourages
nonmembers' submission of notes and reduces the chances that those
that are submitted will be published.
It is easier to detect clues of an intra-law review hierarchy than to
explain them. I venture one, perhaps overly cynical, explanation for the
disdain with which nonmember authors are treated. 165 The essence of
the explanation is this: The invitation of nonmembers to law review is
essential to the law review's survival in its present form because of the
dearth of publishable notes by members, but the nonmembers are re-
sented because their inclusion threatens to expose both of the law re-
view's secrets.
The subversion of the credential (the first secret) is the clearer
threat. The acceptance of a nonmember's note suggests that the normal
routes of selection, and therefore the awarding of the credential, are both
overinclusive and underinclusive. If the law review's members do not
produce enough publishable student pieces, then many or most students
selected for membership are not after all particularly valuable contribu-
'tors to the law review. Furthermore, that there are nonmembers who can
write publishable pieces means that the selection process does not iden-
tify every potentially valuable law review contributor.
The law review's reputation as a worthwhile experience (the second
secret) is also subtly subverted by the nonmember author's admission.
The nonmember's bypassing of a year of law review work could easily
foment resentment among members. They, unlike the nonmember au-
thors, had to pay for their credential with hard labor. Moreover, the
nonmember's success tends to confirm any doubts a member might enter-
164. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
165. A similar argument might also be made of the disdainful treatment of the write-ons.
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tain as to the value of the experience. After all, the nonmember author
who has never participated in the endless chores of bluebooking and typ-
ing is more successful than most law review members in writing a piece
of publishable quality.
Whatever the source of the credential stratification, it prevents the
law review from fulfilling its potential as a dealienating force. First, the
implicit hierarchy fosters competition and resentment, not comradery.
To the extent that some law review members fancy themselves superior,
and others feel themselves unjustifiedly scorned, the law review enhances
alienation. When one group feels compelled to disparage others, and the
others feel compelled to justify their existence, the law review comradery
will be no healthier than that which characterizes inter-student relations
in the law school generally.
Second, if my speculations on the intra-law review hierarchy are
correct, then insecurity will grip everyone. The ritual of disparagement
and self-justification will undermine the confidence of those who are not
at the top of the supposed hierarchy. They could begin to doubt the
legitimacy of their credential, and the worthiness of their membership,
despite the first year's legitimating effects. Moreover, even those at the
top of the perceived hierarchy are likely to doubt their own credential if,
as I have suggested, the administering of other selection processes belies
the legitimacy of their membership.
B. The Inter-Law Review Hierarchies
Some law reviews choose their members on the basis of a single se-
lection criterion. Since, in those situations, no intra-law review stratifica-
tion is possible among members in the same class, the students might not
engage in the ritual of self-justification and mutual disdain that prevails
at stratified law reviews. There are, however, inter-law review hierar-
chies that are even more confidence-shaking. First, there is the hierarchy
of law reviews within schools. Then, there is the inter-school hierarchy
of law reviews.
(1) Credential Differential: The Intra-School Hierarchy
Most major law schools feature several law reviews. 166 Generally
one is referred to colloquially as the "main journal" or "primary review"
while the others are deemed "lower" or "secondary" reviews. (For con-
166. A recent survey found that 14 out of 20 of the most prestigious law schools have three
or more publications; Harvard had the most, with seven, followed by Columbia, with six.
Zenoff, supra note 8, at 22 n.5. The survey is slightly outdated; at last count, Georgetown had
eight.
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venience, I will adopt that terminology, but not the value judgment it
implies.) The lower review members are unquestionably subject to the
same perceptions or delusions of self-importance as are their counter-
parts on the main review. There is as much reason for them to believe
that they are contributing to legal scholarship, and that they were prop-
erly selected to do so. The lower review members are also plagued by the
same self-doubts about the illegitimacy of their credential and the value
of their contribution as are their main review counterparts. If they inter-
nalize their lower position in the intra-school hierarchy, however, they
have an additional source of self-doubt.
As a preliminary matter, we can expect lower review members to
internalize their position in the hierarchy no less than main review mem-
bers and students who made no law review. Particularly revealing in that
regard are the myriad of rationalizations by which some lower-review
members explain their plight. They range from a faulty watch to the
death of a pet. 167 "I just missed grading on to the main review by 0.1
percentage point," could be the law school fight song. It is as if that
fraction of a percentage point would magically make the speaker a legal
scholar or a better person. At the same time, the whining is somewhat
self-promoting: implicit is a statement that the speaker is just as good as
the ones who made the grade-point cutoff; his failure was a fluke. In any
event, far from questioning the hierarchy, he legitimates it by assuming
that an explanation is warranted in the first place. Almost invariably, the
student doubts herself before doubting the system.
Even the rare lower review member who sees the selection process
for what it is, might nevertheless internalize the ranking, for as the cre-
dential of law review grows increasingly concrete so too does the creden-
tial differential between law reviews. The administration reinforces the
differential. The resources and perks of lower reviews tend to be more
limited and their space more cramped.1 68 The budgetary disparity be-
tween main and lower reviews can be perceived as nothing but an admin-
istrative judgment of the relative value of each.
167. My colleague, Michael Small, tells the story of a student who complained at least
once a week for a year about how he had misread his watch during the Civil Procedure exami-
nation. To this day, the poor soul recounts the tale of woe. But for the lapse, he would have
been able to finish the question on International Shoe and made the main review, or so the
story goes.
168. Those law reviews that have large budgets derive their income from benefactors
outside the school, but because those outside sources are usually private interests with their
own agendas, they often interfere more with the law reviews' editorial freedom, implicating
self-doubt in other ways. Cf infra text following note 169 (discussing lower review member's
perception of forced specialization).
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Those material differences might be innocuous if the relationship of
the lower reviews to the faculty and administration were not so distant.
Because the main review bears more directly on the law school's prestige,
professors and deans tend to be more concerned with its success. In con-
trast, there comes a point at which the administration seems to perceive
the lower reviews as distinct liabilities in the prestige calculus. Perhaps
for fear that proliferation of law reviews will somehow devalue the cur-
rency, the administration seems reluctant to authorize the creation of
additional lower reviews.
169
When the administration does certify a secondary law review, it in-
variably must be specialized in subject matter. Some specialization un-
doubtedly makes sense. Whereas there is insufficient demand for more
than one book of general jurisdiction, there is almost always an audience
for the specialized reviews. Yet, that does not explain why the main law
review is invariably the one of general jurisdiction. The only explanation
that comes to mind is an unwritten precept that lower reviews should
never compete directly with, and should always be distinguishable from,
the main reviews. Faded distinctions would prevent employers from eas-
ily discerning the hierarchical lines.
Although a general scope is inherently no better than a specialized
scope, forced specialization among lower reviews is particularly likely to
reinforce self-doubts. First, forced specialization might be perceived by
the lower review member as a reminder of her own incompetence, imply-
ing a distrust of her ability to handle anything beyond the narrow con-
fines of a specialty. Second, if the law review specializes in an area in
which the member has no interest, expertise, or future, her participation
is likely to be less than wholehearted, her identification with the product
more remote, and her resentment deeper.
Finally, the legal community outside the law school reinforces the
credential differential. To be sure, the lower review members can line up
the same prestigious jobs and reap the same benefits as their counterparts
on the main review, but their chances of doing so are slimmer. When
potential employers perceive the credential difference as real and act ac-
cordingly, the lower review member is likely to accept it too, despite any
initial doubts about the selection process.
Despite the clear credential differential, membership on the lower
reviews demands the same mundane tasks that main review members
169. See Georgetown's Publishing Dilemma: Which Journals Should It Endorse?, Nat'l
L.J., May 12, 1986, at 4, col 2 (discussing, without capturing the venomous controversy sur-




endure. If the experience offered by the main review is empty, then the
lower review member's experience is no less so. At that level, the creden-
tial may not be worth the tedium. On the other hand, especially when
membership is based on grades, the credential may be more important to
the lower review member than to the main review member whose tran-
script identifies him as a top student.
(2) Self-Doubt Among the Big Peckers: The Inter-School Hierarchy
Perhaps unbeknownst to the members of the lower reviews, they are
not alone in insecurity. While the main review members are at the pinna-
cle of their school hierarchies, their status in a national pecking order of
reviews-a ranking that Duncan Kennedy has aptly described as "bull-
shit"170-- deflates even their egos.
Every law review longs to be Harvard Law Review, the biggest
pecker of them all. It seems like a class act. It publishes eight issues a
year, and the editors magically manage to meet their cover dates every
time. What no one seems to realize is that Harvard Law Review members
are not necessarily more competent than their counterparts elsewhere.
There is no magic to publishing on time when the law review has re-
sources that others lack. With the full-time support staff that Harvard
has, anyone could speed production. Inevitably, however, the less well
endowed law reviews ignore Harvard's budgetary advantage and impute
its success to the superiority of its members.
In all fairness, it is not just the operational supremacy of prestigious
law reviews that make others insecure; it is their prestige. Practitioners
and judges, especially on the federal bench, continue to cite dispropor-
tionately the most prestigious law reviews. 171 The most sought-after
scholars will decline the less prestigious law review's invitations to pub-
lish in favor of the more prestigious.
These two sources of self-doubt are mutually reinforcing. At least
when it comes to lead articles, the disproportionate citation is a function
of the relative notoriety, and therefore credibility, of the authors that
publish in the top law reviews. Because the most prominent scholars are
most likely to publish in Harvard, it is at least conceivable that Harvard's
lead articles actually are superior, at least under the standards by which
legal scholars measure quality.
It is much harder to believe that the disproportionate citations to
Harvard notes, written by second- or third-year students, evince their
170. Kennedy, Liberal Values, supra note 52, at 605.
171. See Reviewing Reviews, STUDENT LAW., Mar., 1986, at 5, col. 1 (reporting survey of
citation to law reviews).
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uniform superiority over, for example, Vanderbilt's notes. When courts
subscribe to a slew of reviews, it is anomalous that judges and their clerks
still turn to the "heavyweight" journals for student notes. Yet the
credence that both bar and bench give to the most prestigious law re-
views cannot help but foster feelings of inadequacy among the less pres-
tigious elements of the pecking order.
VI. Law Review's Autonomy and Political Clout
Law review may be an elitist institution whose members are not
truly elite. It may provide little in the way of intellectual and creative
stimulation. Accordingly, its members may doubt their own talents and
the value of their scholastic contribution. None of those criticisms, how-
ever, bears directly on the law review's potential to combat law school
repression and law firm reactionism or to take a political stand. Yet the
law review fails to live up to that potential as well.
A. The Law Review's Imaginary Autonomy
I have identified several respects in which the law review fails to
fulfill what I have labelled its affirmative dealienating potential.1 72 It is
not as communal, noncompetitive, creative, or satisfying as I suggested it
might be. In fact, the law review is in some respects an independent
source of alienation among both members and nonmembers. These ob-
servations might not be so troublesome if the law review fulfilled some of
its negative dealienating potential-the reversal of some of those forces
that weaken the oppressive powers. In practice, however, most of the
sources of negative dealienation remain either untapped or ineffective.
The law review never uses the confrontational weapons at its dispo-
sal, its article selection power and power of the press, to influence the
faculty or administration. Law reviews also fail to band together in mu-
tual support against whatever oppressive forces the law schools might
harbor.
The withdrawal element of negative dealienation is slightly more op-
erative, although only minimally comforting. To be sure, the law review
fulfills somewhat the sanctuarial function described in the preliminary
defense of law reviews. It behaves, both physically and emotionally, as a
refuge from law school oppression. Physically, the law review office is
essentially off limits to faculty and administration. Emotionally, it pro-
vides a forum, albeit a private one with a limited audience, for students to
ridicule professors and administration.
172. See supra notes 34-46 and accompanying text.
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The law review seems to stop at that comparatively superficial im-
plementation of withdrawal. It falls short of true institutional autonomy,
which, as the preliminary defense suggests, is considerably more power-
ful. 173 I do not mean to suggest that law reviews are, or generally per-
ceive themselves to be, cronies of the established order. They believe
themselves to be free to make decisions on the content and form of their
product and to make institutional decisions on membership and organi-
zation. That perception of autonomy is certainly dealienating, but it is
also somewhat illusory.
That law reviews are not truly autonomous is evidenced by their
self-restraint. We will never know the boundaries of permissible law re-
view conduct, because law reviews decline to test them. As far as sub-
stance is concerned, the Ecology Law Quarterly will never publish an
article having nothing to do with environmental law. No main law re-
view will ever purport to take a single political stand and advance it
through its choice of articles.174 Law reviews are not willing to diverge
more than nominally from the traditional law review format. Many law
reviews will not publish legal scholarship in haiku form175 or iambic pen-
tameter, nor produce a glossy color magazine. They are unlikely to pub-
lish an article that departs from the specific format that students have
learned to identify with, and consider a sine qua non of, legal scholar-
ship.176 Moreover, there is a certain organizational restraint. No main
law review, for example, would open up its membership to all students.
That law reviews never depart from the norm does not prove that
they never can. An institutional lack of autonomy is not certain until the
institution acts ultra vires and is rebuked. Since that rarely if ever hap-
173. See infra text preceding note 35 (discussing institutional autonomy).
174. This rule holds true generally for more specialized law reviews as well, but there are
exceptional ones-the most prominent of which are the Harvard Women's Law Journal, the
Journal of Law & Social Policy, the Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review, and the
(now defunct) Yale Review of Law & Social Action-that have avowed political agendas. See,
e.g., Howe, Foreward, 1 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (1966) (for "constructive proposal of
efforts to make law an effective instrument for advancing the personal freedoms and human
dignities of the American people"); Tenth Anniversary Tribute, 10 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J.
(forthcoming 1988); Why a Women's Law Journal?, I HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. viii (1978) ("to
develop a feminist jurisprudence").
175. For a rare exception, see Sirico, Supreme Court Haiku, 61 N.Y.U.L.REv. 1224
(1986).
176. A few notable exceptions come to mind, but they are practically all by prominent
scholars. See, e.g., Bell, Foreword: The Civil Rights Chronicles, 99 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1986);
Gabel & Kennedy, Roll OverBeethoven, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1984); Hart, The Power of Con-
gress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV.
1362 (1953); cf Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.L 1087, 1087-89 (1986) (introducing article with
account of author's own rape).
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pens, there is no definite proof of autonomy limitations. The best I can
do is to offer some speculations on the conditions that tend to limit the
law review's autonomy.
In the first place, institutional inertia precludes radical departure
from past institutional practices. That is particularly true when, as in the
law review, the opportunities for assessment and effective power are
short-lived. The time within which to appreciate the law review's fail-
ings, as a member, lasts at most two years and the authority to change
them, as an editor, lasts one.177 It takes nearly that long to get accus-
tomed to each role.
Second, the institution lacks the collective confidence to deviate
from the norm or the incentive to depart from past practice. Because
each law review yearns to be as prestigious as Harvard Law Review, each
is "sucked into a polite little game of follow-the-leader with the Harvard
Law Review setting the pace."'' 78 Because law reviews have successfully
retained their prestige for a century without departing substantially from
the traditional form, there is a strong disincentive to change.
Finally, there is the ever-present, if unspoken, threat of faculty and
administration disapproval. The main reviews are nearly always subsi-
dized by the law school. Perhaps as important is the desirability of
smooth relations. The administration and faculty hold the key to many
nonpecuniary benefits, such as article solicitations, banquet speakers,
clerkships, and the like. Armed with these carrots, the administration
can effectively curtail action that does not meet their approval. Since the
law review's reputation reflects on the law school's prestige, the adminis-
tration will disapprove of any activity that threatens to diminish that
prestige. For the same reasons that law reviews fear change, the effect of
that administration veto is essentially conservative.
B. Political Clout
If the law review does not successfully challenge or diminish the
alienation in its own small community, it should come as no surprise that
the law review does little to reverse that community's reactionism or its
cozy symbiosis with the corporate law firm. In fact, far from deprogram-
ming the curriculum's indoctrination or disrupting the law firm funnel,
the law review reinforces the former and feeds the latter.
177. See Kester, supra note 37, at 17 ("[a] student-run organization, whose members
change yearly, is likely to be inherently conservative; its members usually lack confidence to
distinguish the truly innovative from the foolish"); cf Rotunda, supra note 38, at 11 (because
of short "generational memory," law review repeatedly debates same issues).
178. Rodell, Revisited, supra note 109, at 285.
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(1) Law Review Repression
The law review is more politically repressive than the institution of
which it is a part. 179 I will not here summarize the, vast literature from
all sides most of which appears in law reviews, critical of the scholarship
that law reviews publish. 180 Nor is it necessary to adopt wholesale any
particular view of legal scholarship to conclude that if the law school
curriculum pretends to a neutrality that is false, so too does law review
scholarship. To the extent that the law school curriculum indoctrinates
by making intuitive morality marginal to legal discourse, law review
scholarship is unquestionably susceptible to the same charge, and if the
law school thereby legitimates the status quo and shifts the student's vi-
sions of political action, the law review experience spurs that process.
181
As if to ensure the parity, the law review selects its members on the
basis of exams and writing competitions that measure at most the stu-
dent's mastery of law school doctrinalism. If the law review selects for
internalization of doctrine and reinforces the indoctrination by publish-
ing articles that reflect the same myopia, it cannot deprogram its mem-
bers or the student body generally.
The same false neutrality prevents the law review from affirmatively
taking a political stand, much less taking affirmative political action, on
the issues that motivated its members to enter law school in the first
place.' 82 On the simplest level, the law review typically is afraid even to
comment on the material it publishes as do the editors of so many schol-
arly journals in other disciplines. That refusal to critique publicly the
work of contributing authors can hardly be attributable to a dearth of
controversial material. Surely, authors take positions in law review arti-
cles that are every bit as divisive among law review members as they are
179. See supra notes 62-65 and accompanying text (discussing law school repression).
180. See, e.g., Baron, Self-Criticism, 60 TEMP. L.Q. 39 (1987); Cramton, Demystifying,
supra note 19; Freeman, Truth and Mystification in Legal Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1220
(1981); Kelman, The Past and Future of Legal Scholarship, 33 J. LEGAL EDUC. 432 (1983);
Nowak, supra note 139, at 321-24; Rodell, Revisited, supra note 109, at 279; Schlag, The Bril-
liant, the Curious, and the Wrong, 39 STAN. L. REV. 917 (1987); Singer, The Player and the
Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 YALE L.J. 1 (1984); Tushnet, Truth, Justice, and the
American Way: An Interpretation of Public Law Scholarship in the Seventies, 57 TEX. L. REV.
1307 (1979). See generally American Legal Scholarship: Directions and Dilemmas, 33 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 403 (1983); Kronman, Legal Scholarship: Its Nature and Purposes, 90 YALE
L.J. 955 (1981).
181. See Schlegel, supra note 10, at 19 (law review, like law school, attempts to teach "that
law must be separated from politics and that good arguments are seldom more than one step
beyond existing arguments").
182. I use "affirmative" in the sense discussed earlier. See supra text preceding note 80.
On the political motivations for entering law school, see supra notes 59-60 and accompanying
text.
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in the legal community generally. Consider, for example, Judge Bork's
criticism of Griswold v. Connecticut '13 as "an unprincipled decision" that
"fails every test of neutrality";1 84 Richard Posner's suggestion that un-
wanted children should be sold on the open market;185 and Robin West's
thesis that Posner's reliance on consent as the moral justification of
wealth maximization is misplaced because people often consent to
changes in their worlds out of a Kafkaesque desire to submit to author-
ity. ' 86 The law review editors, adhering to their vows of neutrality, write
not a word in response to such controversial positions. The only time
one might expect a peep out of the law review is when an article, such as
this one, threatens the law review itself.
Given the reticence of law review editors to take positions on the
material they publish, it should come as no surprise that they rarely ad-
vance political agendas openly through their selection of articles and vir-
tually never take positions on important political issues of the day. To be
sure, there are isolated cases in which law reviews have issued such polit-
ical statements: Harvard Law Review in 1969 published a statement criti-
cal of the Vietnam War, by forty-four editors "speaking for
themselves,"' 187 and the Georgetown Law Journal editorial board, among
others, recently opposed the apartheid regime of South Africa by declin-
ing to renew the University of South Africa's subscription.188 There are
183. 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (use of contraception is a fundamental privacy right).
184. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 9
(1971).
185. Posner, The Regulation of the Market in Adoptions, 67 B.U.L. REV. 59, 60-61 (1987).
186. West, Authority, Autonomy, and Choice: The Role of Consent in the Moral and Polit-
ical Visions of Franz Kafka and Richard Posner, 99 HARV. L. REV. 384, 386 (1985).
187. See With the Editors, 82 HARV. L. REV. 6-8 (Jan. 1969). The accompanying explana-
tion specifically noted that the statement "does not purport to speak for the Review as an
ongoing institution ...." A telling colloquy on the propriety of a law review's publication of
political statements ensued:
A substantial minority of editors believe that ... it is improper to use the Re-
view, an institution built up over several decades for a nonpolitical purpose, as a
forum for a statement on a political question. Advocates of the statement reply that
... on a matter like the Vietnam war, which, they assert, transcends ordinary polit-
ical issues, it is proper to record the views of editors . . . . Those who join the
statement regard the occasion as unique and as most definitely not setting a prece-
dent for statements on other political issues.
Id. at vii; see also Rotunda, supra note 38, at 2-3 (describing controversy surrounding publica-
tion of statement). It was not at all clear why such a precedent would be undesirable.
188. See Nat'l L.J., Jan. 28, 1985, at 12, col. 2 (letter condemning decision); The Wrong
Way to Protest, Wash. Post, Jan. 26, 1985, at A18, col. I (editorial criticizing board's decision);
L. Weekly, Dec. 3, 1984, at 2, col. 2 (editorial board's letter defending decision); L. Weekly,
Nov. 19, at 2 (law review member's letter deploring action). After a prolonged and venomous
battle, the membership overturned the decision. See Georgetown Law Journal Rescinds South
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also exceptional law reviews that are themselves political statements,18 9
but the rarity of blatantly political statements by main reviews and the
exceptional nature of openly political specialized reviews underscores
the ubiquity of the sentiment that law reviews ordinarily should not ac-
tively advocate political positions, even though their very silence is politi-
cally eloquent.
Rarer yet are the situations in which several law reviews act con-
certedly toward political ends. Significantly, the most prominent collab-
orative activity in which any law reviews engage is the formulation and
revision of the bluebook by Columbia Law Review, Harvard Law Review,
University of Pennsylvania Law Review, and Yale Law Journal. 90 A
more apt metaphor for form over substance is hard to imagine. 191
(2) The Law Review as Breeding Ground for the Law Firm Associate
In light of the law review's complacency with law school repression
and effective lack of autonomy even in its own realm, it should hardly be
surprising that the law review never attempts to parlay the large law
firm's dependence on it into leverage.192 Nor is it surprising, given the
virtual emptiness of the law review experience and its reinforcement of
law school indoctrination, that the vast majority of law review members
follow their classmates to the megafirms. Law review members are
neither more competent nor more inclined than their classmates to de-
cline the law firm's lure.193
What is initially surprising, however, is the premium that megafirms
place on law review experience. More specifically, the firms that most
value the experience are those with the greatest proportion of law review
alumni. They are the ones who should know better. Having been
Africa Subscription Decision, Nat'l L.J., Feb. 2, 1984, at 4, col. 2. Cf supra note 100 (noting
that several law reviews have affirmative action programs).
189. See supra note 174 (identifying several law reviews with political agendas).
190. The only other collaborative effort of which I know is an annual meeting of the Na-
tional Conference of Law Reviews. See Fidler, supra note 9, at 49-50.
191. Judge Posner described the bluebook aptly:
[T]he Bluebook is elaborate but not purposive. Form is prescribed for the sake
of form, not function; a large structure is built up, all unconsciously by accretion; the
superficial dominates the substantive. The vacuity and tendentiousness of so much
legal reasoning are concealed by the awesome scrupulousness with which a set of
intricate rules governing the form of citations is observed.
Posner, Goodbye to the Bluebook 53 U. CH. L. REV. 1343, 1343-44 (1986).
192. See supra text preceding note 80 (discussing law review's potential to convert law firm
dependence into leverage).
193. See supra notes 66-78 and accompanying text (discussing factors reinforcing funnel
from law school to law firm).
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through it, they should be more aware than anyone that the law review
experience does not, itself, generate top-notch lawyers.
I have already recognized the possibility that many law review
members are oblivious to the emptiness of the law review experience.
Perhaps the others, with the passage of years, romanticize the tedium
like veterans romanticize combat. Either possibility would explain the
patronage. 194
There are also two more cynical explanations of law review pa-
tronage. One is that law review alumni are the ones who have the most
to gain from the continued vitality of the law review myth. Like the
third-year member who declines to divulge the law review's secrets,
95
the law review alumnus has a perverse incentive to perpetuate the myth
by basing hiring decisions on it. What they sacrifice in efficiency, they
gain in credential inflation.
For those who do not believe that any lawyer would ever put ego
before money, there is another cynical explanation. While the law review
experience does not produce the best lawyers, it does breed the best law
firm associates. 196 Law review membership is the perfect training for law
firm associateship because it conditions the subject to accept tedium and
bow to hierarchy.
197
Law review prepares the future associate unflinchingly to perform
tedious and unchallenging tasks. The member graduates from endless
and mindless bluebooking and production assignments in the law review
office to late-night document production at the firm and prospectus-
proofing at the printer. 198 The uninspired and irrelevant student note
that no one reads translates into a dull memorandum on a trivial legal
issue for a partner who merely skims it. While law review members are
beaten with the bluebook paddle, the associate gets his spanking from
194. Another possibility that pride compels me to relegate to a footnote is that I am simply
wrong about the emptiness of the experience.
195. See supra text following note 153 (discussing why third-year law students maintain
law review's secrets).
196. I once again acknowledge the assistance of Michael Small in helping develop many of
the ideas that follow. See also Schlegel, supra note 10, at 18-20 (law review has always existed
merely for the benefit of law firm and judicial employment).
197. See generally Boyle, supra note 6, at 19-20. The socialization is not, of course, fool-
proof. Even two years on law review might not prepare a member for the tedium and aliena-
tion of the megafirm. See Marcus, Gloom at the Top: Why Young Lawyers Bail Out, Wash.
Post, May 31, 1987, at Cl, col. 4.
198. See Nowak, supra note 139 at 322 ("1 admit that the law review experience only will
serve to make the law review editor more economically valuable to the larger firm or
corporation.").
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 39
April 1988] LAW REVIEW'S EMPIRE 925
endless discovery or senseless motions that generate reams of paper and
exorbitant legal fees but little else.
It is possible, although highly unlikely, that associates are content in
the belief that those tasks are meaningful and essential to their develop-
ment as lawyers. It is more likely that they complacently perform such
chores because they believe as they did on law review that the tasks are
(1) the only ones they are competent to perform, or (2) necessary to re-
tain the law firm credential on their resume and the concomitant feeling
of self-worth.
As to the former, the law firm, no less than the law review, fosters a
feeling of incompetence. The partner or senior-associate oversight, the
periodic evaluations, and the official reprimands and stiff sanctions for
mistakes are all reminiscent of law review. The associate has already
been conditioned to respond with self-doubt. This self-doubt leads the
associate to the same conclusion that he drew in similar circumstances as
a first-year student and as a law review member: "I deserve to take this
shit. I am wrong and stupid." 199
As to credential retention, by the time she enters the law firm, the
law review alumna has been well-trained to endure hardship and tedium
for the sake of credential and prestige. No one-certainly no one on law
review-ever disabused her of the notion that a position with a law firm
is a real credential and a worthwhile experience. With the high salary
(over $70,000 at the megafirms, plus clerkship bonuses), 2°° the perks
(housing allowances, spa memberships, firm outings, etc.), and the ego-
massaging accoutrements (law review-like stationery with cablex and
telex numbers, ornate business cards, and the like) that credential grows
increasingly concrete. Law review has taught her how to cling to that
credential to allay self-doubt. She clings also to the hope of parlaying the
credential into even greater credentials, such as partnership or a position
at a more prestigious law firm, just as the law review member clung to
the law review credential for its value in interview season.
The law review also prepares the future associate to internalize hier-
archies uncritically. The hierarchies within and among law firms are
only slightly more rigid analogs of intra- and inter-school law review hi-
erarchies. The same self-doubt is engendered by competing colleagues
who believe their selection to have been worthier, the same subjugation
by demeaning superiors who do not really know that much more than
the new associate, and the same insecurity about the existence of other,
199. See supra notes 17, 153 and accompanying text.
200. Marcus, supra note 198.
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more prestigious firms. The capacity to doubt one's own capabilities in
the face of hierarchies is valuable to the firm. It is a major obstacle be-
tween the associate and the exit.
Conclusion
The law review's course is by no means irreversible. In discussing
my thoughts on the law review with colleagues, they invariably raise the
same question: "If the law review is such a bad institution, what's your
alternative?" "Just do everything the opposite," is hardly a satisfying
response. Although I have detailed a vision of the law review's potential
and excoriated the law review for departing from it, I have presented no
neat, programmatic solution to put the law review on the right track. At
the risk of being labeled a nihilist,20 1 I leave the proposal and defense of
such a plan for another article. My goal, for now, has been more modest:
to sensitize the legal community to problems and spur the search for
solutions. If only I could convince a law review to publish this, or a
lawyer to read it.
201. But see Kelman, Trashing, 36 STAN. L. REV. 293 (1984).
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